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SPEECH vl!____--'-»- 



OF 



HON. R. S. BALDWIN. OF CONNECTICUT, 



IN FAVOR OF 



THE ADMISSION OF CALIFORNIA INTO THE UNION, 



AND 



ON THE TERRITORIAL BILLS, AND THE BILL IN RELATION TO FU- 
GITIVE SLAVES, IN CONNECTION WITH MR.. BELL'S 
COMPROMISE RESOLUTIONS. 



IN SENATE OP THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 27 AND APRIL 3, 1850, 



WASHINGTON: 

rPJVTED AT THE COKCKESSION&.I4 GLOB' OFriCI. 

1850. 



^ '> % % * \ ,\\ 






THE TERUITORIAL QUESTION. 



The Senatfi having under consideration the 
?esolutions of Mr. Bell, of Tennessee, and the 
motion of Mr. Foote to refer them to a Select 
Commiitfe of Thirteen, 

Mr. BALDWIN said: To that motion, Mr. 
President, an amendment was offered by myself 
on a former occasion, which was .subsequently 
modified at the suggestion of tlie Senator from 
Missouri, [Mr. Benton,] to exclude from the con- 
sideration of the committee the subject-matter of 
ihe message of the President transmitting the con- 
stitution of California, and recommending her ad- 
mission into the Union. It is upon that motion 
Shat 1 propo.se to address the Senate, availing my- 
self of the opportunity it affords me to express 
my Tiews somewhat at large upon other questions 
connected with the proposition and with the reso- 
lutions introduced by the Senator from Tennessee, 
[Mr. Bell.] 

I have listened, Mr. President, with deep inter- 
est to the discussions in theSenate on the questions 
presented by the message of the President, and 
the reyolutiona of the distinguished Senators from 
Kentucky and Tennessee. In the general tone 
and spirit wliich have characterized tlie debate, I 
have seen much to admire and something to regret. 
It has been my endeavor to keep my own mind 
free from any undue excitement, with a determina- 
tion, in any legislative act which 1 may be called 
upon to perform, to be governed by tiie spirit of 
ihe Constitution and of t!ie distinguished men who 
coopevatetl in i's formation and adoption. That 
sacred instrument speaks in no sectional language. 
The voices of the whole American people are there 
united in harmonious concord, proclaiming union, 
justice, liberll^, domestic tranquillity, and the gen- 
eral w«a!, tc be its glorious purposes. It was made 
and adopted in a spirit of liberal indulgence to 
conflicting interests and spntiments, tolerating, no 
doubt, some, iiigiitutions then regarded as tempo- 
rary, and some compromises which many of us" 
of the present dny doubtless would wish had been 
otherwise. Eut they are there — they are in the 
Constitution; and so far as my constituents are 
concerned, I feel myself authoriz'-d by the resolu- 
tions of the General Assembly of Connecticut, now 
lying upon your table, to say that the people of 
my own State are prepared to adhere to and abide 
by those compromises, to the letter and in the spirit 
of the same. 

Such, sir, are the instructions, such is the sol- 
emn declRration of the General Assembly of t,he 
State of Connecticut, passed by a nearly unani- 
mous vote of both Houoes of the legislature. 



But they have also instructed their Senators, and 
requested their representatives in Congress, to op- 
pose, in all constitutional ways, any and every 
new measure of compromise by which any pcr- 
ien of our free territory may be given up to the 
encroachments of slavery, or by which the people 
of the United States may be made responsible for 
its introduction or continuance. These instruc- 
tions are in accordance with my own deliberate 
judgment. It will, therefore, afford me great 
pleasure to conform to them. I wish, however, 
not to be understood as concurring in sentiment 
with the disiinguisiied Senator from Michigan, 
[Mr. Cass,] whom I do not now see in his seat, 
and with^iy friend from Illinois, [Mr. Douglas,] 
who have, addressed the Senate on the subject of 
instructions. I should never be willing, standing 
here as an American Senator, to record my vote 
for any measure contrary to the dictates of my own 
judgment, enlightened by the deliberations of this 
body, even though I were positively instructed to 
do so by the Legislature of my State. If t be- 
lieved in this doctrine of instructions — if I believed 
that it was improper for a Senator to avail himself 
of the position in which his constituents had 
placed him, to vote against their wishes as ex- 
pressed in their resolutions — I should feel myself 
bound to render something more than a nominal 
obedience to their requisitions. I should not feel 
at liberty to avail myself of that position in the 
debate.^ of this body to neutralize my own votes 
by endeavoring to influence the votes of others 
against it. I would keep ihe word of promise 
fully, if I felt myself bound by it at all. 

The resolutions now befoie the Senate, offered 
with the best of motives by my distinguished 
friend from Tennessee, and the proposition to re- 
fer tliose resolutions to a committee composed of 
gentlemen from the North and from the South, 
who are to deliberate with a view of making some 
compromise of sectional interest, and bringing be- 
fore the body, in the form either of one act or of 
several acts, the results of their deliberations, do 
not commend themselves to my judgment. The * 
question of California, presented with the message 
of the President, ought not, in my opinion, lo be 
connected with any other question whatever. It 
stands upon its own foundation. If the people of 
California are entitled to be admitted into this 
Union, they have a right to have that question 
considered by itself. They are here claiming a 
right — a right stipulated by treat}- — a right which 
we are pledged, as they insist, to accord to them. 
If they are correct in this o[)jtuoi!i, certaiitly it is 



but fair and just that the question which they have 
presented should not be embarrassed by connection 
with any other proposition. 

The proposition before the Sr nate, and the res- 
olutions of the distinguished Senator from Tennes- 
see also, assume that these are questions which are 
to be decided with leference to nortliern and south'- 
ern interests, as if those interests were antagonistic 
to each other. In my view, this is an unsound, 
and, in its tendency, an unconstitutional mode of 
legislation. It tends to produce and to encourage 
sectional claims and sectional combinations, which 
it was the desire, the anxious desire, of the fiamers 
of the Ccnstitution to prevent. The Constitution 
regards this nation as one people. It knows no 
North or South, or East or West. It regards us 
as one. In the celebrated proclamation of Presi- 
dent Jackson, of 1832 — a measure, which, in my 
judgment, reflected more honor, more credit, upon 
the reputation of that distinguished individual, 
Ihan any other act of his public lile— he says: 

" Tho tf rms used in itfj construction sli.-,w it to be a Gov- 
ernment in wliicli lli« people ol all the States collectively 
are ref»ie.--('ntt'(i — a Government vvliicli operates directly 
upon the people individually, and not on tlie Slates." 

It has provided in itself all the securities which 
were deemed necessary or proper for a fair ex- 
pression of the will of the nation upon every ques- 
tion of public interest. It sedulously guards against 
all combinations of sectional interest, as distinct 
from the general welfare. It confers no power to 
make sectional compacts, or arrangements, for any 
purpose, much less for purposes of that descrip- 
tion, to bind the legislation of a future Congress, 
or to prevent, in any legitimate form, the expres- 
sion of the popular will. Sir, we all represent 
one country, and, in this sense, one constituency. 
And while .staniUng herein this body, our primary 
allegiance is, in my judgment, due to that country 
•which in all its parts is here represented; whose 
requirements of us are embodied in that constitu- 
tional Government we have all sworn to support. 
We are not legislating for the'States of .which this 
Union is composed. We are legislating for the 
people; and not for the people as represented by 
their particular States, but for the people of the 
United Slates. As these resolutions, then, assume, 
contrary to what 1 regard as the just theory of the 
Constitution, and of the tramers of that instru- 
ment, that we are here as a divided people, sec- 
tionaily divided, having sectional interests which 
it is proper for us as legislators to compromise, I 
am opposed to any .'such committee. 

But, sir, in regard to the State of California, now 
applying fur ad mi.ssion into the Union. I am not 
aware liow that can be regarded as a sectional 
question between the North and the South. I am 
not aware of any peculiar interests which my con- 
stituents, as such, have in the decision of that 
question, other than the people of any other por- 
tion of tills country. I am not aware that the in- 
troduction of the Senators and Reprcsetitatives 
from Califori ia, to cooperate with us in our legis- 
lation here, will be any more likely to conduce to 
the promotion of the interests of my constituents 
than to the interests of those of any other portion 
of the country. It is net, thereftue, upon that 
ground that 1 sustain their claims to admission. 
It is well known to members of this body, who 
were here during the prosecution of the Mexican 
war, thai 1 wus opposed to the war. I regarded 



it as a war of conquest, and as irreconcilable, on 
that ground, to the principles of free government, 
upon which our national institutions are based. I 
voted with the Senator from North Carolina, [Mr. 
Badger,] who addressed the Senate the other day, 
against the acquisition of all this territory, antl 
against the stipulations for the admission of any 
of the territories acquired into the Union aa 
States. Sir, the cession jvas made ; the treaty 
was ratified. The dominion of the Mexican 
territory was transferred to the United States. 
What was then their condition? California had, 
as a part of the Mexican Republic, a territorial 
government of its own — laws of its own — for the 
regulation of its municipal concerns distinct from 
those of the Mexican Republic. The general sys- 
tem of law was the same in both. Under that 
Government, and under the laws of its enactment, 
or the laws enacted for it by the Republic of Mex- 
ico, the inhabitants of California enjoyed their lib- 
erty, their property, and their civil rights. Under 
those laws they held them at the time of the ces- 
sion. What then was our stipulation in regard to 
them? By the ninth article of the treaty with 
Mexico, it is provided that, 

" The Mexicans who, in the territories aforesaid, shall 
not preserve the character of citizens of the Me.xican Re- 
puhlic, coiiformahly with what is stipulated in the preceding 
article, shall be incorporated into ilie Union of the United 
States, and admitted at the proper time (to be judged of by 
tlie Congress of the United .State-!) to tlie enjoyment of all 
the rijilits of eitizens of ih'i United Stales, recording to the 
I rinciples of the Constitution, and in the mr-au tinie shall 
he maintained and protected in tlie free enjoyment of their 
liberty and property, and si cured in the free exercise of their 
relii^ioii without restriction." 

Their liberty and their property, in the mean 
time, until in the judgment of Congress the proper 
period should arrive for their incorporatiosi into 
the Union as States, were stipulated and guaran- 
tied to them by the treaty. What was the liberty 
thus guarantied in the mean time to the Mexican 
inhabitants of California? Not their political lib- 
erty, of course, because they v/eie not in a condi- 
tion at that time to be admitted into this Union; 
but their civil liberty — a right to be protected by 
just and expedient laws, properly administered. 
I'his was the guarantee. Their property was that 
which they held under those laws. Ilere, then, 
was a solemn duty assumed by the people of Jhe 
Uniied States by this treaty, binding them, until 
the people of Calh^'ornia should be in a conditioH 
to be incorporated into the Union, to give them 
full protection, by law, for their liberty, their 
property, and their civil rights. t| 

That treaty, of course, became the supreme law 
of the land; and it became obligatory upon the Pres- 
ident of the United States, as the Executive of this 
nation, to see that its requirements were duly exe- 
cuted, as it is our duty now to sfc that the other 
stipulations of that treaty are faithfully fulfilled. 
What were those laws that v/ere thus to lie admin- 
istered for their protection ! They were of neces- 
sity, either the laws which, at the time of the 
treaty, existed and regulated the property and the 
social relations of the people, or they were laws 
to be substituted for them by the Government to 
which dominion was transferred. Ti;ey could 
emanate from no other authority. If, then, the 
then existing Mexican and departmental laws were 
not abrogated by new enactments, the treaty con- 
tinued them in force just as much as if they had 
been reenacted. The siipulationa for the proteo- 



tion of liberty and property cpiild not otherwise 
be fulfilled. There was no necessity for any 
act of Con^rp?^^, such as v. ::3 passed upon the 
transfer of Florida, to continue in force the exist- 
ing laws. The treaty necessarily, in the fulfillment 
of it.^3 own atipulaiion for the protection of the 
rights which the people of the United States had 
assumed the obligation to protect, continued those 
laws in force as fully as they could have been con- 
tinued by any enactment whatever. California 
became thereby, in fact, a territorial government 
or department of the United States, having its own 
system of laws, though not, perhaps, the power 
of enacting new ones, bat having a system of 
laws which were continued in operation, and ad- 
ministered by officers existing in that territory, 
formerly as a territory of the Mexican republic, 
but now as a territory of the United States. 
These laws were not ooly not abrogated, but they 
were, in fact, expressly recognized by Congress; 
for, by a joint resolution passed on the 2d of 
March last, the Congress of the United States 
invited emigration to the Territories of California, 
of Oregon, and of New Mexico, and directed the 
Secreta.ry of War to furnish to the emigrants who 
might apply for them, arms and ammunition, at 
cost, for their protection. What made California 
and New Mexico, regions boidering upon each 
other, separate territories in the opinion of those 
by whom this taw was enacted ? They could be 
separate only, because they were governed by dis- 
tinct systems of local administration — distinct sys- 
tems of law for the protection of the civil rights 
and the property of the inhabitants. If the ces- 
sion which was made by the extension of the 
boundary of the United States, so as to compre- 
hend all this rfgion, obliterated the territoijjpil 
landmark.^, destroyed the territorial government, 
why, sir, they could not have been spoken 
of and treated by Congress as distinct tetri- 
toriee, as they were. It is not and cannot be 
claimed that Congress was bound to continue 
in force all the laws then existing for the govern- 
ment of the territories. They might be amended j 
and improved; but the treaty guarantied that 
Congress should do all that was neces.^ary, either ; 
by the adoption of the preexisting laws, or by 
the enactment of others, to secure the people of ; 
those territories in the enjoyment of their liberty I 
and properly. Weil, sir, "the benefit of this guar- } 
antee, although made to the Mexican inhabitanis, i 
necessarily accrued to all v/ho, by the invitation of 
Congress, chose to amigrate, and make California 
a habitation and a hoivie. Now, there can be but 
one system of local legislation for all the inhabit- | 
ants. Wiiether, therefore, the inhabitants ofj 
California wece the original Mexican iiihabitants, j 
or whether they were the emigranis introduced in 

Eursuance of our invitation. Congress was equally 
ound to afford them a system of law adequate 
to their protection. 

Mr. YULEE, (interposing.) Mr. President, if 

the Senator 

Mr. BALDWIN. I should prefer not, as I do 
not like the practice which has become so frequent 
of late in the Senate, unless I have made some er- 
roneous statement of fact which the Senator 
wishes to correct. 

Mr. YULEG. That ia precisely what I rise 

for — to correct a fact which seems to me material. 

Mr. BALDWIN. Then I will yield the floor. 



Mr. Y'ULEE. The Senator stated, in relation 
to Florida, that the Spanish laws were recognized 
by an act of Cotigress as continuing in force upon 
the transfer of that country to the jurisdiction of 
the United States. I rise for the purpose of cor- 
recting the Senator upon that point of fact. The 
Senator is entirely mistaken in the statement which 
he makes. On the contrary, the only code of 
laws which was recognized as having force in 
Florida after possession was taken by General 
Jackson was the code of laws adopted and issued 
by General Jackson, under authority of a joint 
resolution of Congress, which empo.vered the 
President of the United States to appoint an offi- 
cer to receive possession of Florida, and to hold it 
in possession, conferring upon that officer all civil, 
judicial, and legislative functions which had 
been previously exercised by Spanish officers. 
General Jackson, under that authority, recognized 
such laws as he deemed suitable for the territory, 
and enacted other law.s himself; and under these 
laws the people of Florida were governed until 
the territorial act was passed. The act to which 
the Senator refers had reference to the laws adopted 
and promulgated by General Jackson, and not to 
the Spanish laws previously in existence. I make 
the correction now, because 1 ob.-^erve that the 
same error has been made in the other House, and 
perhaps in this on a previous occasion. 

Mr. BALDWIN resumed. It ia perfectly im- 
material, as far as regards my own argument, 
what system of laws had been adopted in relation 
to Florida. I introduced it incidentally, for the 
purpose of showing that, in my judgment, if there 
was a treaty binding this Government to protect 
the citizens in their liberty and their property, and 
this Government had neither enacted nor author- 
ized the enactment of any other sysem of laws 
than that which then existed, and under which the 
inhabitants were protected in their civil rights, it 
necessarily fo'lows that thoi^e laws must be con- 
tinued; for, otherwise, the treaty obligations could 
not be fulfilled. Had California continued as it 
was, composed of a few sparse settlements, the 
laws in force at the time of the cession would have 
been ample for their protection. Their interests 
were small; their transactions with each other were 
comparatively few; their temptations to crime were 
slight; but, under our authority, by our invitation, 
j a vast influx of population from all ports of the 
I world, have migrated to California. Ships from 
j Europe and Asia and Western America, as well 
as from our own coast, have entered their magnifi- 
I cent harbors, richly laden with the products of 
i every climate. Mines of gold of unsurpassed 
I richness have allured adventurers of every descrip- 
I tion, and given a new impulse to labor in all the 
j departments of industry. Towns and cities have 
I arisen among them, as by magic; thousands of 

I people are clustered together, from different na- 
! tioiis, of dissimilar habits, differing m their usages, 

II and the systems of law to which they had been 
I accustomed in the places from which they migra- 
}' ted — differing not merely from those of the Mexi- 
\\ can inhabitants but of each other. It is perfectly 
ji obvious then, sir, that the pysi'-m of law, and the 
|| administration which would have yielded compe- 
|i tent protection to the Mexicans inhabiting this 

} territory at the time of the treaty, would now be 
j totally inadequate to the exigencies of society. It 
l! is true, sir, that there is there a rery large propor- 







tion from the best population of this country. It 
is mingled with a population from other regions 
requiring tlie reslraiiit of severer lav/s than any 
that have heretofore existed there. We ali know 
that, in a remote country like that, thus newly 
settled by those who are stran«;ers! to each other, 
who come with habits thus dissimilar, the ordinary 
restraints of society, which stand in the place of 
law in older countries, have but a feeble hold upon 
the population. What, then, was the necessary 
result.' That liberty and property were in a great 
measure unprotected. Crimes were committed , 
und there wtre no adequate tribunals to try and 

f)unish the offender. Contracts were made and 
)roken, and there were none to administer ju&tice. 
Rights of property were violated with impunity. 
Who was responsible for all this? The old Mex- 
ican laws, the old departmental officers, were 
entirely inadequate to the purposes for which Gov- 
ernment was now needed. What, then, should be 
done.' They appealed to Congress. Congress, 
representing the supreme power of this Govern- 
ment, to whose dominion they had been trans- 
ferred by Mexico, refused to interfere — refused to 
aid them with a system of laws adequate to the 
circumstances in which they were jilaced. Even 
the writ of habeas corpus and tlie right of trial by 
jury were vainly attempted in this body, at the 
last session, to be conferred upon this distant peo- 
ple. Mexico had relinquished her dominion to a 
power that refused to exercise it efficiently for 
their protection. The greater portion of the peo- 
ple were our own citizens, our own kindred, our 
sons. What could they do? What was the 
President, bound as he was by the duties of his 
office to see that the stipulations of this treaty 
were properly fulfilled, required to do? Was he 
to fold his arms quietly, and leave these people 
unprotected, without an eflbvt to secure to them 
the fulfillment of the stipulations of the treaty? 
Was it the duty of the people of the territory to 
remain unprotected by the neglect of Congress ? 
or was it their rijrht, as American citizens, inher- 
iting as their birthright the great principles of 
liberty, for which their fathers had contended 
through the war of the Revolution, to .seek pro- 
tection for themselves by the establishment of a 
government wliieh Congres.-? had refused to pro- 
vide for them? Were they not right when, under 
these circiwnstances, they ap]>lied to the only 
representative of the sovereign power of this 
Government who was among them? and was he 
not bound to yield his assent, as he did, to their 
request? It was their right. Allegiance and pro- 
tection are reciprocal duties. It was our duty, it 
was the duty of our public officers, of our Exec- 
utive, to see that those people were provided with 
a government adequate to their protection. 

Mr. BORLAND, (interposing.) Mr. Presi- 
dent, will the Senator jiermit me to ask him a 
single question ? — to ask him if he did not liimself 
refuse to vote for giving a govermnent to Califor- 
nia.' — if he did not refuse to vote for a measure 
which he sayf was indispensably necessary ? 

Mr. BALDWIN. The question, Mr. Presi- 
dent, as regards my own vote at the last session 
of Congress, is entirely irrelevant to the proposi- 
tion I am now maintaining. I did vote, «ir, 
against one of the propositions to give to this peo- 
ple a government, because I thought that, it was 
not such a goverumenl as they ought to have — 



not such a government as the obligations of good 
faith required us to give them. 

When this territory was about to be ceded to the 
United States, or rather during the negotiations 
with the Mexican Government, her commisaioners 
expressed an earnest desire that the people of the 
territories which were ceded might be protected 
against the introdiiction of slavery there. I voted 
at the last session of Congress agaiuitt the proposi- 
tion for giving to ihis people liie government which 
was then proposed, because I was unwilling that 
the existing jaws of Mexi(!o, which prohibited 
slavery, should be abolished by Congress. I was 
unwilling that any territorial government should 
be formed that did not contain a provision to secure 
them that ])rotection which they h«d desired so 
earnestly to make a condition of the cession. But,, 
sir, I myself introduced to the consideration of thia 
body a proposition to extend to tliia people the 
benefits of their existing laws, and to add to them 
the privilege of the trial by jury and the writ of 
habeas corpus; a writ to which every American 
citizen ought, in my judgment, to be entitled. No 
Government, sir, can arquiie dominion, and refuse 
to exercise it for the proterlion of a peofile situated 
like these, without giving to that [leonle the right 
to provide for their own protection. You may call 
it revolution, sir, or by any othernamc; but it has; 
its origin and its defence in natural right. It rests 
on the principle upon which all free government is 
based — upon the inherent right of every man and of 
every community to provide for tiieir own preser- 
vation. 

This people, thus driven by necessity to the form- 
ation of a government, have shown, by the wis- 
dom which distinguished the action of their con- 
ven^on, their capacity for seif-governraent. ThiSj 
sir,*viil not be denied by any one who has read 
the proceedings of that body. And if they have 
proved tkis, they iiave proved a right to come herCj 
as they have done, and ask of us to say, in the ex- 
ercise of an enlightened judgment, whether the 
proper time has not arrived for their admission into 
the Union as orje of the States: and if so, to re- 
quire us to fulfill the obligations of the treaty and 
the assurances thai were given by Mr. Buchanan 
and by the American Commis.^ioners to the Mexi- 
can Government after the ratification of the treaty 
by the Senate. What were those assurances? Mr. 
Buchanan, in commenting on the ninth article of 
the treaty as altered by the Senate, in ins Ittter ad- 
dressed to the Minister of Foreign Relations of the 
Mexican Government, on the iSih March, 1848,. 
said: 

" Congress, under all llie eirciimstance>-, and ander the 
treaties, are the sole ju(1jj;es of Ihii* prii|»;r (line, bec.iuse 
tliey, and they alone, lUKlcr liie Ferlcral Constitution, bave 
power to admit new States into the Union. That they will 
always exercise this power as soon as the condition of the 
inhahilants of any acquired territorj-niay rfiider it proper, 
cannot be doubted. By this inrnnn the Federtt! Tfeasury 
can alone he relieved from the expense of supporting terri- 
torial governments. Besideg, Coiigres.-- will never turn a 
deaf tar to a pi'ople anxious to enjoy the privilege of selt- 
goveniment. Their desire to Ix^conie one of the Slates olf 
this Union will be granted Uie moment it ran he doua with 
safety. " 

Thi.^, ."^ir, was what the Mexican Government 
were told, after the Senate had made their alter- 
ations in the ninth article in the treaty, was the 
true construction of the language they had intro- 
duced. It was after the reception of this letter, 
giving the construction of our own Government 



7 



in regard to this nnd other alterations that were 
made, that the Mexicsn Government acted in the 
ratification of the treaty. Are we not, then, bound 
by it? 

It has been said that they have done a revolu- 
tionary act in the formation of their Government, 
Why, sir, they have done no act against the sov- 
ereignty of thia Government. They have not op- 
posed our dominion; they have not set up for 
themselves an independent government. What 
they have done, they have done with the cooper- 
ation of the only representative of our Government 
on the spot, who knew and felt the necessities of 
that people, and which, in his judgment, required 
them to act precisely as they did act. Whatever 
they have done, they have done in acknowledg- 
ment of our right to the exercise of dominion, and 
in pursuance of their desire to avail themselves of 
the provisions of treaty by which they were enti- 
tled to become incorporated intaour Union, And, 
sir, if they had said nothing of this kind, they 
would only have followed the examples set them 
by the ancestors of many of them more than two 
hundred years ago. The colonists of Connecticut 
met in January, 1639 — finding themselves out of 
the limits of Massachusetts, and of every other 
jurisdiction — and formed a plan of government, 
under which they agreed to live — a system of gov- 
ernment which, with few exceptions, in all. its 
great principles for the security of liberty and hu- 
man rights — for the advancement of education — 
for the promotion of all the objects of a wise and 
good government — remained substantially the gov- 
ernment of that St-ate for a period of nearly two hun- 
dred yep.rs. Thatgovernment was thus formed by 
about eight hundred individuals, who bad come to 
that remote region to form a settlement, without tj|e 
consent of the British crown, without a charfLT, 
and v/ith no title to the land except such as they j 
fairly purchased from the aboriginal inhabitants. 
It remains a proud monument of their wiadoni, 
and furnishes enduring evidence of their recogni- \ 
tion and adoption, at that early period, of the I 
great principles of human liberty. So the colony i 
of New Haven, then a sepsirate colony, having no j 
connection with Connecticut, but which afterward ' 
united with it under the charter of Charles the ! 
Second — they, too, under the auspices of their j 
distinguished leaders, John Davenport and Gov- j 
ernor Eaton, at the head of a colony of emigrants 
from the city of London, men of intelligence, of j 
education, and of sound judgment, formed a con- 
stitution for themselves, under which they lived 
in security and happiness. , 

The question, then, for Congress to decide is, 
not whether it is strictly regular for California to 
form a constitution and demand admission, as a ! 
legal right, into this Union — a right perfect and 
absolute — it is whether, when they have framed a 
constitution and applied to Congress, and when 
we concede that in substance the casus fcedsris has 
arisen, whether under these circumstances, we will 
not receive them, although there may have been 
some irregularity in their incipient proceedings; 
whether we will not overlook that iiregularity in 
the case of California, as we have done in other 
cases, and admit them to a full participation of our 
rights? If we find that the sentiments of the peo- 
ple have been fairly expressed, v/hy have they not 
the same claim that the people of Arkansas, of 
Michigan, or of Tennessee even, presented, when 



they applied respe'itively for admission Into the 
Union. The people of these States had , it is true, 
been under a territorial government differ/?rit froin 
the fterritorial government which existed in Cali- 
fornia, but no more a territorial government, than 
that which was continued in existence by theefFeci 
of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. The exigen-= 
cies which, in the opinion of Congress, entitled 
those people to admission had arisen. The terri- 
torial government, in permitting the forrrtation of 
the constitution, had been guilty, in some sense, 
of the usurpation of a power that strictly belongs 
to Congress; but it was waived, as the Senator 
from Maine [Mr. Hamlin] has shown in his 
speech. Forms, sir, have rarely, in the history of 
our territorial governments applying for admis- 
sion as States, been rigidly adhered to. V7hy, 
sir, what right had the convention of 1787, which 
franaed the Constitution under which we now livCf 
to destroy tlie old articles of confederation, and 
present to the people a constitutional government 
for their adoption f Their powers were limited to 
the amendment of the articles of confederation. 
Bat, sir, they saw that the exigency had ariseri 
when this peojde required something more — that a 
government should be estalilished — and they as- 
sumed the reai>onsibility of framing and presenting 
to the people a constitution. Mr. Madison, in 
speaking of this in the Federalist, says: 

" T'ney must liave recollpcied tliat, in at! great changes of 
est.iblislied gouernmeiUs, forms ought to give way to sub- 
stance ; it is essential lliat sucti clianges stionld be instituted 
tjy some informal and uaaiitliorized propositions." 

The declaration of independence, too, was not 
an act competent to the colonial legislatures; it was 
an act of original inherent sovereignty by the peo- 
ple themselves, in whose name they imdertook to 
i act and to declare these United States to be one 
people. But if the act of California were to be 
regarded even as a revolutionary measure, and not 
merely an irregular exercise of their right under 
the treaty, by a people desirous of cotning into 
the Union, and enjoying the rights and protection 
stipulated by the treaty, we should all be ready 
to admit that it h much less obnoxious to censure 
than a revolutionary act by an old State with a 
view to di.sunion and all the disastrous conse- 
quences that would follow. 

This people have done no act in disregard of our 
authority or in denial of our right to dominion 
over them. Ssein^- the impossibility of our con- 
ferring upon them a government .«!uch as was 
required by their wants, "they formed a government 
for themselves, of vjhich they ask our sanction 
and approval. Tliey call our attention to their 
population, now probably exceeding one hundred 
and twenty thousand, and daily increasing with 
unexampled rapidity; to their capacity for free- 
dom; to their republican constitution; and the 
earnest desire of the people to be admitted to the 
enjoyment of the rights and privileges to which 
they claim to be entitled under the treaty.. 

If then, Mr. President, the people of California 
are here under a claim of right; if they have a 
right to call upon Congress to "judge," in the 
language of the treaty, of the «' proper time" for 
their admission; if they have exhibited themselves 
before us in such a light that, in the exercise of an 
honest judgment, we' are constrained to say, they 
are entitled to sidmission; what, I ask, has the 
North, what has the South, what has any eec- 



tional interest to do with its decision? Why 
should they be mixed up with our coiiroversy in 
regard tojocal questions not afFet-tin^ themselves? 
The.^reat question which lias agitated us in re;r«fd 
to other territories, they have settled, rightfully 
settled, for themselves. Then, why is this intro- 
duced as one of the elements of compromise, by 
which conflictiiiy; opinions or conflicting interests 
are to be adjusted by a committee chosen with 
reference to sectional interests? If they have 
a right to be here, if ihey have a right to be 
heard, if they have a ris^ht to claim admis- 
sion, because the " proper time" in the judgtnent 
of Congress has arrived, they have a right to 
come here, standin<c upon their own merits, and 
to claim that they shall not be embarrassed in any 
way, by being involved in the agitating questions 
of sectional politics. What good effect, Mr. Pres- 
ident, can be anticipated, under these circum- 
stances, from the appointment of a committee of 
compromise to take into consideration this claim 
of California? A committee of this body, not 
fontied upon any principle of compromise, but 
one of ourregular committees, has already reported 
a bill — a separate bill — for the admission of Cali- 
fornia, and territorial bills for the government of 
the other territories acquired from Mexico. 

But it is said by gentlemen representing sec- 
tionn! interests, that the adinissinn of California as 
a free State will disturb some fancied equilibrium 
which it is desirable to maintain between the free 
States and the slave Stater.; and hence it is pro- 
posed to exclude California., mUwithstanding she 
js here under the claim of right, until, by some 
arrangement, a new State can be introduced formed 
out of Texas, and perhaps until we can form a 
Territorial Government for New Mexico nnd 
Utah which shall open them for the introduction 
of the peculiar institutions of the South, or until 
we shall settle the account of northern aggressionis, 
as they are called, in regard to fugitive slaves and 
anti-slavery petitions for the exercise of the con- 
stitutional power of this Government. I can per- 
ceive, sir, no reasonable hope of benefit in the 
organization of any such committee. On the other 
hand, should they report as a compromise 
of separate billa — one for the admissios' 
fornia, one for the admis.=!ion of Siates fso;; inc 
territory of Texas, one for Territori'?! govern- j 
ments without the. proviso of the orcjinance of i 
1787, for New Mexico and Utah, and one in rela- 
tion to fugitive slaves — why, sir, if any one of 
these should be adopted, and the others should 
fail, should we not hear of imputations of bad 
faith charged upon all who voted against any 
measure thus reported ? Sir, I can consent to the 
appointment of no committee which shall have 
even the moral power to pledge me or my action 
as a member of this body in regard to any future 
measure which may be offered to my considera- 
tion. 1 must act for myself, i must act according 
to the dictates of my own judgment; and every 
Senator should be in a condition to act upon every 
individual proposition that is nr\io to this body, 
without being subject to the imputation of bad 
faith, if some mea.-sures which he approves should 
be adopted, and other measures which he disap- 
proves rejected, by his vote. If, on the other 
hand, instead of reporting these different measures 
in separate bills, they are all incorporated into one 
bill, what is the consequence ? VVhy, sir, unlesa 



they all meet the approval of ihe majority of the 
members of this body, California is to be kept out 
of the Union, her peoole are to he left unprotected, 

and the fA'.'c of th.- Govern;™ nt ;)!ecigpc5 ^/ the 
treaty is to be violated, because we cannot agree 
to carry out all the elements of compromise that 
may be recommended by thia committee. Sir, 
as I said before, this is a mode of legislation 
which, in my judgment, is against the spirit of the 
constitution; it is wrong, though well intended, 
I know, on the part of the distinguished Senator 
from Tennessee who introduced the resolutions, 
and of whot--c patriotism and spirit of conciliation, 
no one can entertain a doubt. U is a course of 
legislation which invites sectional combinations 
and the pursuit of sectional claimp, for the purpose 
of beinsr presented as the elements of some future 
compromise. 

The resolutions of the honorable Senator from 
Tennessee [iVlr. Bell] propose that Congress 
shall renew the assent given by the joint resolution 
of March, 1845, for the formation of three or four 
new slave States within the present territory of 
Texas, asserting, on the face of the resolution, 
that the faith of the Government is already pledgedi 
for their admission. If, indeed, Mr. President, 
that be the effect of the joint resolution, no act of 
ours cat) strengthen or impair the obligation. 
Whether it be so or not, appears to me to be a 
question which this Congress are not competent 
to solve. The entire territory of Texas has been 
admitted as a State; her admission as a Slate has 
been acquiesced m by the peop'e of the United 
Stales; she is a member of this Union as a sover- 
eiirn Stnte, standing upon an equal fooling with 
all her sister States. But, sir, the joint resolution 
which invited her, and which, it is claimed, con- 
si^Tted an irrevocable compact with Texas in re- 
gard to future subdivisions and the admission of 
new States fortned out of her territory, was pro- 
tested against by many States as being an uncon- 
stitutional enactment. That, sir, I may indeed 
say, was the sentiment of the majorityof this body; 
for the joint resolution could never have been 
passed, had there not been a clause .^ittached to 
■ e bill, giving the Pre.sident the alternative of 

ting by negotiation, which, it v/as confidently 
Hupposed by Senators who voted for the resolu- 
tion, the Proftident elect was [ilcdged to adopt. 

Sir, the constitutionality of that act was pro- 
tested against by my own State, and by the Slate 
of Massachusetts; and her protest was recorded 
here, after the passa<;e of the joint resolution, and 
the acceptance by Texas of the overture it pro- 
posed. That resolution was passed in March, 
1845; the General Assembly of Connecticut, at 
their session in May foOowiitg, passed resolutions 
in these words: 

"Resofier?, That tlifi power to admit into the Union new 
States, is not conferred upon Congresti by tin; Constitution. 

'■Resolced, 'I'hat the aiiiiexatinii of a hirge slavcholiling 
territory by the Government of ttse Uiiiteil Slates, witlithe 
dpclareil iiitcnliiin of giving strengtti to the institution of 
(ioHie.stic clavfry in th.j States, is an alarming encro»climent 
upon the ri^Sits of the frermen of the Union, a pciversion 
of the princlpliis of repulihc.in government, ftnd a deliberate 
as.^ault upon llu^ compromises of the Constitution, and de- 
nrrtnris the stre!iuou>', united, and per.-severing opposition of 
ah peraon^' who claim to bu the friends ofliuriian liberty." 

There was another resolution of similar import, 
which I will not read at thi-s time. Assuming it to 
be the true construction of the Constitution, as in 
my judgment it is, that foreign territoriea can be an- 



9 



rexed by the ireaty-making power alone, it would 
follow that the joint resolution for the annexation 
of Texas was simply void. If so, I am not pre- 
pared to say ihnt the acquiescence of the people of 
the United S;ate3 in the uni(;n of Texas, has any 
other f (feet I han to place Jier, by reason of that 
acquiescence, and not by reason of the joint reso- 
lution, on the footing of the other States in the 
Union. 

In the debate on the British commercial conven- 
tion, in 1816, the distinijuished Senator from South 
Carolina [Mr. Calhoun] stated his opinion tn be, 
that whatever could be done by the treaty-making 
power could not be done by law. The Supreme 
Court of the United States have decided that the 
treaty-makinof power is competent to acquire for- 
eign territory, and ail the practice of this Govern- 
ment anterior to the annexation of Texas was in 
conformity with that decision of the court. No 
territory had been acquired from a foreign Gov- 
erjiment except by the action of the treaty-making 

tower. The power to admit new States into the 
Fnion is a distinct power, applying only to the 
territories of the United States — a power to be ex- 
ercised t ffeciually only when a new State is formed 
and ready for admission. The Constitution of 
the United State.^ declares that "no new State shall 
be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any 
Other State;" not that this may be done by the 
consent of Consress. "New States may be ad 

* mittid by Congress into this Union; but no new 
•Stale shall be formed or erected within the juris- 

* diction of any other State; nor any State Ise formed 

* by the junction of two or more Stales or parts of 
•States, without the consent of the Icgislatureii of 
' the States concerned as well as of Congress. ^| 
But the clause in the Constitution prohibiting the 
formation of any new State within the jurisdiction 
of any other State has no qualification whatever. 
Congress cannot now authorize the formation of 
a new State within the jurisdiction of Texas. A 
new State, when formed, can, in the view of the 
Constitution, have no relation to any other State, 
but only to the Union. Texas, tiien, must first 
cede her jurisdiction, divide her debt, apportion her 
domain, witiidraw herself into reduced limits, and 
leave out of her jurisdiction entirely the territory 
which it is claimed shall be admitted into the 
Union as a new State, before Congress can, in 
pursuance of the Constitution, authorise its form- 
ation. 

When Maine came into the Union there was ;-. 
preexisting law, passed by Mas^•achusetts, author- 
izing her to form a State indtpendenily of Massa- 
chusetts. And so it was when Kentucky came 
into the Union by the cession of her territory by 
Virginia. Has Texas ever offered to do this? 
Ha.s Texas ever manifested a desire to embrace 
the condition annexed to the joint resolution ? 
Have " the South" independently of Texas — the 
undefined "South," which has been represented by 
so many Senators upon this floor — has she a right 
to ins'.ht that Texas shall do this, or shall be 
permitted to do it, for the purpose of restoring 
some fancied equilibrium by the introdu^^iion of 
new Senators into this body? Is California to 
wait untd some new rotlen-borovgh system can be 
brought into existence for such a purpose ? 
Whether any future Congress will be bound to 
admit any new States withm the present territory 
of Texae, may well be left to them to decide when 



Texas shad consent to dismemberment. An act 
of future legislation will then be required, what- 
ever we may now resolve. It is a grave question 
which I do not consider it necessary for anyof ua 
now to undertake definitely to decide. Some fu- 
ture Congress may be obliged to determine it It 
is enough for us to know — 

" Nov nostru7n tnntas cawponere lites." 
When Texas, in December, 1845, havirg as- 
sented to the conditions in the joint resolution and 
disrobed herself of her sovereignty, offered herself 
for admission, fouiteen Senators in this body re- 
corded their votes against her, comprising, if 1 re- 
collect aright, all of the Whig members, with the 
exception of four, including the honorable Senator 
from Georgia, [Mr. Berrien,] who felt themselves 
bound by the pledge made by the joint resolution 
and accepted by Texas, and voted for her admis- 
sion. Tne fourteen Whig Senators who voted 
against it acted in accordance with the protest of 
Massachusetts, which was tiien presented by her 
SenatL'rs. 

Suppose, Mr. President, that the objection was 
not to the joint resolution annexing Texas, but to 
some of the conditions, as nncon Uitutional. .Sup- 
pose there had beeti a condition, offering to Texas, 
if she would come into the Union, the privilege of 
being entitled to four Senators, or that she might 
keep a navy in time of peace; and Texas had con- 
sented to that joint resolution, and offered hcr.self 
for admission; would it liave been binding upon 
this Government? Would the faith of the Gov- 
ernment have been pledged ? Texas, of course, 
knew when she was negotiating for admission into 
this Union, what were the rights and obligations 
the enjoyment ot' which she was seeking to acquire. 
She had perfect knowledge of the Constitution of 
the United States. Without de.signing to express 
myself any definite opinion on the question 
which I have no right now to decide, 1 protest 
against its being sent to a committee of compro- 
nii.^e, that may lead to an imputation of bad faith, 
if, wiien they present some other measure which 
I may feel disposed to sustain, 1 should be unwill- 
ing to reassert in the language of these reRolution."?, 
the obligations of that pledge. Suppose that Can- 
ada should, in the course of some few yerrs, be 
considered ripe for admission into the Union, 
and by a majority of one vote a joint resolution 
should pass admitting her, and authorizing her 
territory to be cut up from time to time into tenor 
twelve new Stntes, to affect or change some sup- 
posed equilibrium of power: are the South — is 
this body — now prepared to say iii;ii it would be 
in the power of any one Congress — a Congress 
chosen for no such purpose — if by any means a 
majority of a single one could be secured, to bind 
so essentially the policy of this Government for 
any or all future Congresses ? This is a grave 
question — one which deserves mature con.^idera- 
tion. When the lime shall come, when Texas 
will be ready to make application to subdivide 
herself in the manner proposed, otiicrmen will be 
here to occupy our places — men who will claim the 
right to act and judge for themselves; and I have no 
doubt that they will judge justly and wisely. If 
they shall be of opinion that new States from the; 
territory of Texas are entitled to admission — if, 
upon the great principles which have hitherto gov= 
erned Congress in its administration of this power, 
they shall then be of opinion that the proper time 



10 



has arriycri for such action, they wil! no doubt do 
what sh.iii seem right and just, under the circum- 
stances which shall then surround them, unaf- 
fected by anythi.ig that we may now resolve. Ac- 
cordin.- ;^'> r.h.e spirit of tlie Cou.stitution, ou2;ht not 
those who ere to be called upon to exercise a 

[)ower of this magnitude — those who must act 
egislativeiy before that power can be carried into 
effect — to be in a condition to exercise their own 
free judgment, untrammelled by the legislation of 
ihose who have preceded them years before, and 
who, under less favorable circumstances, may 
have endeavired to bind their actions ? 

But, sir, ihis is a question that no State but 
Texas can rai?.e. What has the South to do with 
it? Texas has done nothing to manifest her desire 
to have it taken into consideration now. She re- 
tains the wholeof her jurisdiction still, and, instead 
of curtailing, she is seeking to enlarge it, by swal- 
lowing up the greater part of New Mexico. When 
she does cede, the question will then wise, not 
with Texas, but with the new State to be created 
out of the territory of which Texas shall waive 
her right of jurisdiction. It v/ill be presented on 
its own merits, and will be much more likely to be 
decided justly then than in a period of excitement 
like the present. !t appears to me that we had 
better address ourselves to the duties of Ifgislation 
which call for our action, avoiding what may re- 
produce the excitement and agitation that attended 
that most disastrous event — the ainiexation of 
Texa.s. What right have we to interfere, even to 
propose to Texas to dismember lierself for the pur- 
pose of restoring the equilibrium of the slavehold- 
isig States.^ What would Virginia say if this 
Congress wfre to throw this apple of discord in 
her midst, and ask her to divide hetself into two or 
more States? What would any States in this 
Union say to ti proposal by Congress to divide up 
iheir territory? Would they acquiesce in it? 
Would they submit to it? No, sir; they would 
my it is time enough for Congresa to act, when 
Congress cat? a'..t pursuant to the Constitution upon 
territory beyysid the jurisdiction of any State. 

I trust then, Mr. Piesideut, that California is not 
to be connes!L(i with any quetJtion like this — is not 
to be called i;i>on to wait until Textis shall have 
taken another census to ascertain that she has 
population enough for another State — until Texas 
shall be able to arrange with other portimsa of the 
territory the burden of her debt, and be willing to 
make a voluntary offer of a daughter as in readi- 
ness for the uniott. California, as I have t^aid, is 
here upon her own right; she is here demanding 
the fulfillinent of a treaty stipulation. We cannot, 
in my judgment, ask her to stsnd by until ahy 
other quesiions than those which concern herself, 
and herself RJonc, are arranged. 

With regard to the other questions which have 
been connected with this subject, it seems to me 
that the only constitutional and proper mode of 
treating thetii, is to act upon them as they arise. 
The question of the extension of slavery over free 
territory, is a question which, in my judgment, 
does not admit of compromise. It invcdves a 
deep-seated [)rinciple. It is a question which, 
when thus presented, must be met, and met fairly, 
and decided as a question of principle, on which 
we may differ, to be sure; but it must be decided 
by the aetiot) af the constitutional organs of this 
Government, in the only way that their action is i 



contemplated by the Constitution. If tliey decide it 
wrong, we have a judicial tribunal for those who 
t'eel aggrieved by the decision. But the question 
is one that the people of this country will never be 
satisfied, in niy judgment, to see made an element 
of compromise, and for the very reason that it is 
a question of principle. I am not referring to the 
morality of slavery, to the evils of slavery; but I 
am assuming the fact to be as it is, and as we all 
know it to be, that a large portion of the popula- 
tion of these United States are, in principle, op- 
posed to assuming any portion of the responsibility 
for its extension into territory now free. The 
Constitution never contemplated any extension of 
slavery. The Constitution has nothing to do with 
the recogniti(>n of slavery, except as it exists in 
the case of persons held to labor by the laws of 
particular States in the Union, whom it regards as 
debased by their servitude to the amount of two- 
fifths of their personal rights, and as such, allows 
to be the basis of representation and taxation; and 
for the performance of the duty imposed in regard 
to fugitives from labor. The Coiistitutiott recog- 
nizes the fact that involuntary servitude may exist 
by the laws nf the States which tolerate it, ia regard 
to persons ov/ings!;rvice. Itcan existby the j>9vver 
of Congress, in my judgment — except where the 
Constitution, for the mere purpose of recapturing 
and ret uriiinga fugitive, allows it — only where Con- 
gress possesses despotic power. Slavery can exist 
under no Government that does not possess des- 
potic power. Man canuct be made a slave, unless 
some other man has by law the power to make 
him so — for the reason that, in the absence of 
human law, the natural law of equality must pre- 
vail, Tvhieh gives to every man, in the language of 
Chief justice Marshall, "the fruits of his own 
labor." It may creep in silently in the absence 
of positive enactment, and be recognized by a gen- 
eral usage among the people, which ultimately 
acquires tlie force of law; but its legality can be 
established only by the force of positive law. To 
whom, then, do these territories belong? They 
belong to the nation. No Stale in this Union, 
can, under the Constitution, acquire territory. 
They can neither make war, compact, nor treaty. 
Dominion must be exercised by the power that 
acquit es it. The President, as the treaty- making 
power, represents emphatically the tiation. The 
States, as such, exert no influence, except f^uch as 
their Senators, appointed under the Constitution, 
and the Repre.sentativew from the different districts 
in the State, are enabled to exert as members of 
their respective bodies. They do not act here, as 
under the old Confederation, as States, but by a 
majority, however the body may be constituted. 
In the exercise, then, of this dominion over the 
territories, there can be but one will, and that will ■ 
is the collective will of the people. That will can 
be manifested only by the legislation of Congress. 
The treaty-making power haviti;; the right to ac- 
quire territory and dominion, Congress, by the 
general grant of power, to make all laws v/hich 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
execution all the powers vested by the Constitu- 
tion in theGoverntiient of the United States, or in 
any department thereof, has the power of exer- 
cising the dominion. Congress, of course, must, 
unless they are restrained by some prohibitory 
clause, judge of the necessity or the propriety of 
their legislation in reference to the purposes of 



11 



the union, and the welfare of the inhabitants of the 
acquired territory, both present and prospeclive. 
Their legislation affects the people of the territory, , 
not an citizens of a State, but aa citizens of the , 
United States. The States to which they belonged ,| 
cnn.iol follow them with their laws, when they ^ 
have left the State to seitle in a Terntorjr 1 hey | 
owe no longer allegiance to the State. They are 
citizens of the United Si«tes, inhabitants of its 
Territory, and eubject alone to its laws. Other- | 
wise, if the StatoB wers to be regarded i!-. the gov- ; 
crnment of the territory; if the State laws are to ; 
have any force or application there, U would fol- 
low that there could be no supreme law of tne 
people, because the States being equal, the law ot 
every Slate would be equal to that of every other: 
neither could be supreme, and there would be as 
great a variety in the codes of law as there are 
States to be affected by any peculiar interests they 
might desire to protect. The constitution f [Mex- 
ico", and her lawi=i, it has been shown, prohibited 
slavery at the time of the annexation of these ter- 
ritories to the United States. That law, regulating 
the personal ris-hts of the inhabitants of Mexico, 
and their relations to each other, not being a polit- 
ical law entering in'o the government of the terri- 
tory, remaina in forco, notwithstanding the cession, 
until it is abrogated iiy the Government that has , 
succeeded to the dominion. '\ 

But it is said that slavery, being purely a do- ], 
meatic institution of the States, Congress, as the - 
leHslitive or'^an of the Government of the Unitea i 
St'ates, has no concern with it. If it be meant by 
this, that Congress has no concern with slavery in 
the States, why, it is perfectly true. Nobody 
claims that Congress can exercise any power over | 
slavery in any State. Nobody, sir, in any part j 
of the country, within my knowled<;e, sets up any j 
claim of that sort. But, if it be meant that Con- , 
eiess cannot therefore prohibit it, where the policy 
of a territory is to be regulated exclusively by 
Congress, I deny the proposition. Congress must 
exercise its dominion, in reference to the weliare 
of the territory, precisely in the same manner, 
having- reference to the great fundamental princi- 
ple? upon which our Government is formed, as 
any State Legislature is required to exercise its 
dominion within its own limits. Congress must 
judge for the inhabitants of a territory what laws 
it sh^ll enact for them, and what laws it shad pro- 
hibit them from enHcling, because Congress exer- 
cises the dominion. Well, if this be so, what 
ground is there for any State to say that Congress 
interferes with her rights.' Do these territories 
belong to the several States? I know that some 
of the resolutions which have been passed by the 
State Lp'^islatures have been passed m that form. 
But there is nothing in the Constitution to sanc- 
tion any such idea. The treaty-making power 
negotiates for the nation-not as the agent of the 
States. The territory is acquired for the Union. 
The constituencies of the nation are the neople, 
not the States. The people are equal, undoubtedly; 
but every citizen has not the rghi, therefore, as 
it is claimed, to go upon the territory, either with 
his properly or without his property, until Con- 
gress chooses to invite emigration to the territory. 
When the citizens do go there, they stand in the 
territory upon an equal platform; they are all 
treated alike; for all the laws within any given 
j^rif-diction affect the inhabitants residing in that 



jurisdiction alike. It has been msiPtec! '.hat, m 
! the absence of any positive prohibition nc slave- 
ry in the territories by Congress, s a-ery can go 
,! there on the ground that every '"'J^^'^^,''"' ^^^ * 
' right to take whei the Constitution of rne. United 
' Suu.sadmil.t.. be properly Thai deper.us upoa 
I the sense in which this adrnis.sion, if .here be 
' such, is to be understood. If the Govf rnnient of 
' the United Stntes recognizes merely the idct that 
; certain persons, by the laws of certain State?, owe 
!i se vice.'^or are de4ed slaves by the laws cf those 
1 States; and if the Government of the United Sta e« 
', has assumed the obligation of giving extra temto- 
' rial force to those lawafein one particular case 
only-thatof a wrongful escape, as it is called, 
from the dominion thus legally exercised over the 
slave-does it follow, if the master volantanly 
takes his slave out of the jurisdiction of the S^te 
in which he is thus held, that the Constitution of 
the United States can in that case recognize him as 
a slave ? Not al all. This question If ^ been re- 
1 oeatedlv decided. It has been uniformly held that 
1 fhat clause in the Constitution of the United State, 
i in re-ard to the restoration of fugitive slaves, has 
Ino application whatever to a slave who is taken 
' voluntarily beyond the jurisdiction of the f^e 
; whose laws have created the relation The law 
: on this subject is pfrfecily well established, not 

I only in Great Britain, but in this country. In 
/ Surge's Conflict of Laws, a work of high author^ 
!i itv, the law is thus .;taled : 
i « There exists," says Burge, "a status which i9 

II le-al in the country in which it is constituted, but 
i illeo-al in another country to which the person may 
11 resSrt. In this connicl there has been an uniform- 
I; itv of opinion among jurists, and of decisions by 

judicial tribunals, in giving no effect to the satus^ 
i however legal it may have been in the countiy in 

I which the person was born, or m which he was 
previously domiciled, if it be not recogmzed by 

i' ihe law of his actual dnmicil. .This principle was 
adopted by the supreme conned of Mechlin as es- 
tablished law, in 1531. U refused to issue a war- 
rant to take up a person who had escaped f onn 

I' Spain, where he hnd been brought and legally held 
in slavery.' —t-'/trist Dec. ioDi. 4, 1>£C. bU. 

li «' By the law of France, the slaves of their co! 

]j onies, immediately on their arrival in France, be 

I! come free." ^ , n n, -^ 

'■ «« In the case of Forbes vs. Cochrane, 2 B&rn 
i! and Cress., 463, this question is elaborately dr 

II cussed and settled by the English court of K. I 
I' « The ri -ht to slaves, (it is there said,) when toler 
ii « ated by law, is founded, not on the law of nature 

I ' but on" the law of that particular country. U is j 

! < law la vwitum; and wh.n a party gets out of th 

il « nowe^- of his master, and gets under the protectio 

' « of another power, without any wrongful act don 

' ' by the party giving that protection, the right c 

' the masier, which is founded on ihe municipc 

« law of the particular place only, does not cor 

« tinue The moment a foreign slave puts his to( 

•on our shores, he ceases to be a slave, becauE 

•there is no law here which sanctions his bein 

' h'-ld in slavery; and the local law which held hii 

' in slavery against the law of nature has lost i 

. force.' "—9 Eng. C L. Rej). 115. 

That is the principle of all the decisions ug: 
•his question. It. is recognized as law by the &i 
nreml Court of the United States. It is reco; 
nized ae law by Chief Juslic* Shaw, m Mas^; 



ehusetts, in the case of Lu'^as, which I had 
occasion to cite on a farmer discussion. How are 
the rights of the master to Ije asserted where there 
is no law establishing .slavery i The slitve nu\y es- 
cape; how is the master to recover him r Tiie slave 
brings the- writ of habeas corpus; by what law in 
force in that territory can the master declare him 
to be held ? Clearly, by none. In view of these 
principles, I am very clearly of opinion, Mr. Presi- 
dent, that slavery is now prohibited by the continu- 
jno^ Mexican law in the Territory of New Mex- 
ico, and in all the territory over which i' is now 
proposed to establish territorial fjovcrnmeiits. If 
80, it may then be a.sked, Why do you claim that 
Congress should, in the territorial bill.-j, superadd 
a provision for the prohibition of slavery ? Why 
do an act which is unnecessary, slavery being 
already prohibited there? If a territorial bill is 
passed, and the powers of government conferred 
upon those who may emisjrate to the territory, 
and there is no restriction to prevent the establish- 
ment of slavery, it may go there; it may silently 
creep in; it may get a foothold in that way, as, it 
has already been remarked in the course of the 
debate, it lias done in almost every State where it 
has ultimately estal^lished itself. It is to prevent 
the possibility of slavery beins; established in the 
free territory that many are desirous to extend 
over it the ordinance of 1787. If a territorial 
governinent is established there — if laws are marie 
diffsring from the old Mexican la*s now in force 
■ — if those Mexican laws are abrogated — why, 
we all know that if the climate is ad;>pted to 
slavery, the avowed determination which has 
been distinctly manifested in several of the south- 
ern States to introduce it at all hazards, leaves 
little room to doubt that it may, and ultimately 
will, find access there. But southern gentlemen, 
ill whose opinions confidence is reposed, deny 
that the Mexican laws prohibiting slavery are 
nosy in force. It is claimed that the Constitution 
of the United States has already found its way 
into the territory and established slavery there. 
Having already considered this legal question, I 
will not stop now to speak of it agiin; but if this 
opinion be extensively entertained by southern 
lawyers, unle.?s there is a distinct provision by 
Congress for its exclusion, can it be said that 
there is no danger that slavery will gpt a foothold 
in the Mexican territory, which is now free.' 

It is said that the laws of nature forbid it; and 
therefore it will be regarded as a wanton insult 
upon the feelings or the prejudices of southern 
gentlemen, if such a prohibition is contained in 
ihe territorial bill. But here again the facts are 
denied. It is asserted by southern gentlemen, that 
this territory is adapted to slave labor. It has been 
asserted in this body that slavery will go there if 
it is not prohibited. The very excitement, the 
Tery agitation which has prevailed in different 
parts of the cour;try upon tliis subject, shows that 
such an opinion is entertained. Is it to be tup- 
posed that the people of the South would become 
agitated and excited to such a degree as to threaten 
danger to the Union itself, unless there was some 
real interest to be affected by the quei^tion3 about 
which this excitement has arisen? 

Are we required to believe that th's southern 
States, who unanimously enacted the ordinance of 
J787, can now, at this late period, regard it as of- 
fenaire that that ordinance shall be applied toother 



territories? Can it be believed that, if there was 
no reason to expect that slavery would find its 
way into the territories, there would be any more 
excitement likely to grow out of the application of 
the ordinance in this case than in the case of Ore- 
gon, or of the territory north of the Missouri line? 
Why should there be? No new principle is now 
asserted. It is merely the application of an old 
principle, settled and well cstabliMhed, and repeat- 
edly enacted from the origin of the Qiivernmerjt 
down to the present day, to a new territory, and 
to a territory which, when we acquired it, was a> 
free from slavery as the territory of any of the free 
States of this Union. 

And, sir, as to the matter of feelin!;. As has 
already been said, the people of the free States, 
and individuals from all parts of the country who 
are opposed to the system of slavery, regard it as a 
principle which is not to be yielded; that territory 
v/hich is now free shall remain so; and that, there- 
fore, if there be any danger of its being permitted 
to become slaveholding territory, it ought not to 
become so for the want of any action of the Con- 
gress of the United States which it may consti- 
tutionally adopt to prevent it. There is noun- 
kind feeling in the matter. None is entertained. 
None whatever ia intended to be indicated. It is 
the same feeling applied to these territories that 
led to the unanimous adoption of the ordinance of 
1787. If gentlemen from the South think slavery 
will go there if not prohibited, other gentlemen 
hare are authorized to assume that it will go there 
unles.9 it is prohibited. And if tUere be this danger, 
then gen'lemen from the North know perfectly 
well that there is but one opinion among their 
constituency in regard to the policy of affixing the 
prohibition. 

But, sir, I regard it as important on another 
ground. TexasWas annexed to this Union, — and 
that annexation is th3 cause of all this trouble, — 
with a view to sfrensthen and sustain the system 
of slavery in the South. There are other Mexican 
possessions in the vicinity of Texas of an equally 
enticing clmricter, anil the same spirit of cupidity 
for the acquisition of foreign territory that led to 
the annexation of Texas and the conquest of these 
territories, will hereafter lead to other wars, other 
conquests, other annexations. 

Mr. RUSK, (interposing.) Will the honorable 
Senntor allow me one single mjment? I have 
heard it frequently asserted upon this floor that 
Texas was annexed to the United States for the 
purpose of streiigtlieniiig the slav* holding power. 
No such element entered into the question, so far 
as Texas was concerned. It was a subject which 
was never taken into consideration by her; and I 
was not aware, and am not inclined to believe, that 
it was the motive of the United States. I can 
speak confidently for Texas. 

Mr. DAWSON. "Will the honorable Senator 
allow lYie to ask the Senator from Texas otia 
(Hie.'^tion ? 

Mr. BALDWIN. Certainly. 

M r. DA VVSON. Will the Senator from Texas 
inform the Senate whether, during the period that 
Texas was an independent Republic, slaves were 
imported there from any other covuitry than the 
United States? 

Mr. RUSK. Never, sir. At the very first 
Legislature, the importation of ulaves from any 
other country than the United States was prohtb- 



13 



ited, and mude puni.shal)!eas piracy. It was never 
dorH", sir; and could not be done. 

Mr. B\LDVVIN. I alln led to the documents 
publishe i to t'ie w>rld l>y the orican of ihia Gov- 
ernment, under the adminiatralion of President 
Tyler — lo ;i document published under the sisna- 
ture of the di-^tinsfuished Senator from South Car- 
olina, [Mr. Calhoun;] his letter to Mr. Paken- 
ham, the British Minister at Washington.* 
Mr. SE WA RD. And of Mr. Upshur, also. 
Mr BALDWIN. Yes; and his predecessor, 
Mr. Up^^hur. These documents are amply suffi- 
cient, j-i my judgment, to establish the point. I 
have not ij It the a now at hand; but they have 
been pl.ve.l before us here during tlie debates upon 
ihis 3u'>ject. [ must be parmitied todravi/ my own 
conclusions from them. If other gentlemen draw 
diffdreiu conclusions from these document;;, they 
are at liberty to do so; but, sir, it has been dis- 
tinctly avowed on this floor, by the distinguished 
Senaiir from South Carolina himself, that he ur^ed 
the annexation of Texts on the ground that Great 
Britain w js making eflTorts to procure the abolition 
of slavery in that Republic; which, if successful, 
would leave an exposed frontier to the aggression 
of the abolitionists, and endanger the institution 
in the bordering States. And, sir, causes may I 
exist with regard to the other provinces of Mexico 
conligjous to Texas, which will seem to demand 
their acquisition for a similar purpose. It is cer- 
tain, indeed, that they will exist. Those territo- 
ries are now free; and if it is understood to be the 
settled and irrevocable policy of the Government, 
in accordance witli what was the policy of this 
Government in 1787, to regard free territory as not 
subject to the admission of slavery, then 1 say the 
temptation to wars of annexation in that direc- 
tion, will cea-^e. 

I do not, Mr. President, intend to occupy the 
time of the Senate with discussing at large either 
the moral or the political aspects of slavery. I do 
not consider this a fit occasion for the discussion 
of the one, and I have heretofore submitted to the 
Senate fully, my sentiments with regard to the 
other. ! do not, therefore, deem it necessary now 
to occupy their time with the further discussion 
of them. 

But, Mr. President, it is claimed that these 
questions shall go to a coinmittee, for the purpose 
of being compromised, with a view to a fi:ial set- 
tlement of the account between the different sec- 
tions of the Union in regard to the recovery of 
fugitive slaves, and the agitation growing out of 
the course pursued by individuals in the free 
States ill relation to this subject. I propose, Mr. 
President, to say a few words in regard to the 
aggressions which have been imputed by the hon- 
orable Senator from South Carolina and others, to 
the free States in reference to fugitive slaves; and 
I beg to Bay, sir, that so far as my own State is 
concerned, j'deny that she has ever been unfaith- 
ful to any obligation imposed upon her by the 

* In the letter of Mr. Calhoun to Mr. Pakeiihani, daterl 
Washington, April 27, 1844, he says : '• The United Staler 
in coneJii'Jinfi; the treaty of annexation with Texas, are not 
disposed to shun any rei^piMisihility which may fairly attach 
10 them on aerountof the transaction. The measure was 
adopted with the muiii'il consent, and for th>; mututi and 
peiminent w>;llare <if the two countrier; interested. It was 
made neaasuTy in order to rnaerve domestic irxHitiitioni placed 
under the guaranty of their respective conUUutions, and 
icemed es»e)iJio{ to their safety and happiness.-* 



Constitution of the United States. Prior to the 
decision of the Supreme Court, in the case from 
Maryland which has been alluded to — the case of 
Prigg vs. the State of Pennsylvania — it was the 
opinion of the Legislature of Connecticut that it 
was a duty pertaining to the States, and not to the 
Government of the United State.^, to provide the 
means of enforcing the provision of the Consti- 
tution of the United States on this subject. They 
pa.=(sed a law for the performance of that duty in 
a manner calculated to fulfill what they supposed 
to be their obligations under the Constitution, and 
at the same time to secure the free citizens of the 
Stale from the danger to which they were exposed 
from the s.immary action of inferior State officers, 
acting under the law of Congress. They prohib- 
ited their inferior magistrates from the exercise of 
the functions conferred on them by the act of 
Congress, and provided that at^y judge of the 
supreme or superior courts, any judge of the 
county or other court, having power under the 
laws of the State to issue the writ of habeas cor- 
jjus, might, upon tne application of any person 
claiming a fugitive from service under the laws 
of another State, issue a warrant for the appre- 
hension of the fugitive, to bring him before such 
judge fir a hearing. If he claimed to be a free 
mail, the law provided that, at the request of 
either party, an impartial jury should be sum- 
moned to hear the case, and determine upon 
the respective rights of the parties. And if that 
jury should find that the individual did owe ser- 
vice to the person who claimed him as a slave, 
then it was made the duty of the judge to grant a 
certificate for his delivery, pursuant to the provis- 
ion of the act of Congress. When the decision 
was made by the Supreme Court in the case of 
Prigg vs. the State of Pennsylvania, that all action 
of State legislatures on the subject was unconstitu- 
tional, and that this whole business pertained ex- 
clusively to the United States, to be exercised, in 
accordance svith its law^s, by its own tribunals, the 
State of Connecticut repealed the statute which had 
been enacted in good faith, when she supposed it 
to be her duty to act in this matter. Not being 
willing that every inferior magistrate should ex- 
ercise, without responsibility to the State, the 
tremendous power conferred upon them by Con- 
gress, of deciding the question of human liberty 
cr slavery, she prohibited them from acting as 
Slate magistrates under the act of Congress. But, 
sir, the act contained a proviso that nothing therein 
should be construed to impairany rights which, by 
the Constitution uf the United States, might per- 
tain to any person to whom, by the laws of any 
I other State, labor or service might be due from any 
j fugitive escaping into the State of Connecticut, or 
I to prevent the exercise in that State of any powers 
I which may have been conferred by Congress on 
I any judjre or other officer of the United States in 
relation thereto. Now, sir, in my judgment, this 
I is right. The judger; of the United States now 
] have the power to perform ti.i-s duty under the 
I Constitution; but the inferior niagi.-.tiates of the 
' States have not, and, in my opinion, ought not to 
I have, the right to exercise it. Why should they.' 
I Whose duty is it to perform this service now? 
1 The highest tribunal of the land has declared it to 
1 be the duty of the Government of the United 
' States, and that State laws interfering in any way 
( with its performance are null and void; that the 



14 



State magistratM are not compelleil to perform it, 
but that it properiy belongs in the officer.? appointed 
by the Goveriiment of tlie United Sinies. Well, 
sir, what i.< the character of this duly, and by 
whom should it. be performed ? By vour lawa as 
they Jiow exist, by the judjre.s of the United States. 
]n every State they have the power to exercise it. 
Who else can be constitutioaally qualified for its 
performance? Who but a juiJge of the United 
States, holding hia office by the independent ten- 
ure of a judge, as prescribed by the constitution, 
can perform this judicial duly ^ 

Without concluding, Mr. Baldwin gave way to 
•n adjournment. 

Wednesday, ^^pril 3, 1850. 

Mr. BALDWIN resumed and concluded the 
Bpeech, as follows: 

Mr. President, when I last addressed the Senate 
on the topics involved in this debate, which has 
eince been so painfully interrupted, I was com- 
menting on the imputed aggressions of the non- 
Blsiveholding; Slates, and, among; others, on the 
charg;e implied by the report of the Committee on 
the Judiciary, that they had wrongfully refu.sed to 
aid by legislation in the recaption of fugitive slaves. 
Hai-iiis: repelled, succesflfuily, aB 1 believe, the 
impuiution that my own S'ate hnd been unfaithful 
to any obligation imposed by the constitution, and 
shown that, by the decision of the highest judicial 
tribunal in the land, no duly whatever in relation 
to such fugitives rested on the States, I v/as con- 
sidering the question: By whom and in v/!iat 
manner the duty imposed by the Constitution ought 
to be performed ? ! had stated, but without fiis- 
cuseingthe proposition, thatit pertained exclusively 
to the courts or judges of the United States, holding 
their offices by the independent tenure prescribed 
by the Constitution. Thi.s will appear, I think, 
very clearly, by a comparison of tjie two clauses 
in the Constitution that have been referred to in 
the debate, relative to fugitives from justice, and 
fugitives from service. The first is in these v/ords: 

"A person charged in any Stale with treason, felony, or 
ether crime, wlio shall fl :e Irnin jn-tice and lie found in 
another Btaie, fliall, on rteniaml ol ilie exei-ulive aulhoriiy 
of the Stile from wliiih he (^ ri. be deliveieri up !ii be re- 
moved to the Slate huinj jurisdiction of the crinse." 

The object of the demand by the Executive of 
a State, under this clause of the Constitution, is 
to obtain the eurretider of a person charged with 
crime, who has fled from justice, in order ih.u he 
may he rem»nded for trial to the Smte from which 
he fled, and which alone can have jurisdiction of 
his oifence. It contemplate.^ no trial, of course, 
in the State where the fugitive is arrested, nothing 
beyond the simple inquiry necessary to ascertain, 
preliminarily to his surrender, that he Im in truth a 
fugitive from justice, duly charged with crime in 
the State from which he fled. On the nscertain- 
liient of these facts, he is surrendered by the Ex- 
ecutive, and not by the judicial tribunals of the 
State. 

The claupe relative to fugitives from service, on 
the contrary, has a totally different purpose. Its 
language is this : 

" No person held to service or labor in one State, under 
the ln\v8 thereof, escaping into another, ;liall, in conse- 
quence of any law or regnlaiion therein, he diictiarsed 
from such .service or laboi-, bul i-hail be dehvereil up on 
claim of the patty ta whom such seivicc or labor may be 



The fugitive from labor is not pursued or 
claimed for the purpose of remanding him for trial 
in any other Slate. He is not required as an of- 
fender who has fled from justice, to be tried in the 
jurisdiction from which ha has et^caped tic is 
pursued, jf .n slave, on a claim that he is the pro- 
perty of the claimant, whose delivery to his-absolute 
control he has n right to denv-ind at the place 
where the fugitive is found. The jiroceeding, 
therefore, whatever it may be, in that jurisdiction, 
having for its object the surrender of the person of 
the alleged fugitive to the claimant, aa property, is 
necessarily final. The moment the surrender is 
made, the control of the claimant over the person 
of the fugitive is complete and abi-olute. This 
clause in the Constitution has reference only to 
those classes of servants who, by the laws of any 
State, owe service whick they are compellable by 
personal restraint to render to him to whom it is 
due. It includes not merely slaves, but apprenti- 
ces also, who are subject to the personal control of 
their masters during the period of their appren- 
ticeship. It relates only to persons who escape 
from the Stale under whose laws they are held in 
involuntary .^.ervitude into ano'lier Slate. It pro- 
vides that a fugitive shall not be discharged from 
such service by reason of any law or regulation 
in the State to which he niiiy flee; in other words, 
that he shall still be held to service under the lawrs 
of the Slate from which he escaped, and shall be 
delivered up for that purpose. 

The flTeci of the clause is, therefore, to give 
extra-territorial force to .he laws of that State 
over the fugitive, and to deprive him of the bene- 
fit of the law of the State to which he has fled, if 
there be one, or, if not, of the law of Nature, 
which would otherwise govern, prohibiting slave- 
ry- His escape from his former domicil is re- 
garded as a icri'ng, from which he is precluded as 
a wrong doer from taking beuefit. 

The party to whom his services are due may,, 
according to the decision of the Supreme Court, 
under this clause of the Constitution, pursue and 
reclaim him, first, by simple recaption, without 
warrant; or, second, by a judicial claim preferred 
to the competent authority for the delivery of the 
fugitive. "A claim," said Judge Story, in giving 
the opinion of the court in the case of Prigg w. 
Pennsylvania, " in a just juridical seni-.e, is a de- 
' mand of somn matter of right made by one. per- 
• son upon another to do or to lorbfar to do some 
' act or thing aa a matter of duty." If, on an ar- 
rest being made in pursuance of such a claim, the 
person seized us a fugitive alleges that he is free, 
his allegation is in accordance with the presump- 
tion of law; for the law in every free State, where 
slavery does not exist, presumes that every man 
within the limits of its jurisdiction is a freeman, 
until the contrary is established by evidence. The 
case, then, constitutes, in the language of the Su- 
preme Court, a controversy between the parties, 
arising under the Constitution of the United 
States, within the express delegation of judicial 
power given by that inatrument. "Itisplrtin," 
says Judge Story, " inasmuch ns the right is a 
' right ot property, capaljle of being recognized 
'and asserted by proceedinsrs before a c^urt of 
'justice, between j>ariies adverse to each other, it 
1 ' constitutes in the strictest sense a controversy 
I ' between the parties, arising under the Constitu- 
i ' lion of the United Statee, within the express 



15 



' delegation of judicial power given by that instru- 
' ment. " It is a question involving on one side a 
mere claim of pr-iperty; on the other, human lib- 
erty — a rii'ht of inappreciable vilut, which is to 
be, in effect, finally decided by the result of the 
investigation. It cannot be as3unied in the first 
instance, that the person thus seized is a fugitive, 
or that he ever was a slave. These facta, which 
lay at the foundation of the jurisdiction of the tri- 
bunal, and are necessary for iu; action, must be 
judicially established by evidence satisfactory to 
the judge. The inquiry is not, as in the case of the 
fugitive from justice, for the purpose of reinatiding 
him for trial to anntlier jurisdiction. It is for the 
purpose of deliverinij lurn up to the claimant as 
property, to be removed at his pleasure, to his 
t'ormer residence, or to a slave market, to be sold 
among strangers into hopeless slavery. Surely, 
before this can be done under the Constituticni of 
the United St-ites, in a State \vhere the person ar- 
rested is presumed to be free, it must be satisfac- 
torily proved that he is a fugitive from another 
State, and that he owes involuntary service under 
its laws to the claimant. The decision is, in ef- 
fect, final and without appeal. 

How, then, can it be said, with propriety, that 
this in a case in which anything short of full proof 
will answer the requireuient.^ of ju-.tice? Has not 
the man who is seized in a free State as a slave, 
but who claims to be a freeiaaii, a right, before he 
shall be withdra^vn from his own jurisdiction, 
from a region where he is surrounded by his 
friends, who can prove his title to freedom, to have 
a full trial before a competent tribunal, which .';hall 
ascertain the facts in controversy by unquestiona- 
ble evidence.' Is he to be surrendered up to per- 
petual slavery upon a mere ex parte affidavit of the 
claimant.' VV^hat is there to di.stinguish this case, 
except in its greater magnitude, from any other 
investigation before judicial tribunals where there 
are conflicting claims? These two persons, in the 
free State where the proceedings are held, stand 
upon equal ground at tlie outset of the investiga- 
tion. The alleged fugitive stands there as a free- 
man, and with the rights of a freetnnn, until he is 
proved to have been a slave. How, then, can the 
court discriminate between the claimant and him 
whom he has seized, and say that anything short 
of full and entire proof shall be enou:jh to autho- 
rize hia transpnriatio.i beyond tlie limits of the 
Stale to whicii he claims to belong? 

Sir, the difficulties growing out of this great 
question are intrinsic and inevitable; they are in- 
creasing as slavery is abolished in one State after 
another. When the act of 1793 was passed, nearly 
all the States of this Union were slave States. In 
many of them everjr man of color was presumed 
to be a slave. When brought befoie a tribunal for 
the purpose of investigation, he appeared before 
that tribunal with every presumption against him; 
but now, one State after another having ab<ilished 
ihe system of slavery which then prevailed, he 
stands before the tribunal before which he is ar- 
raigned, as a freeman, and as such is entitled to all 
the rights and to ail the privileges that pertain to 
freemen before any tribunal, until the contrary is 
established. Were it not, sir, for this clause in the 
Constitution, a slave escaping from a slave State to 
a State where slavery did not exist could not be 
pursued and recaptured at all, because the free 
State, when not bound by any such provision aa 



exists in our Constitution, would be under no obli- 
gdtim, by any law of comity, to give extra terri- 
torial force to the bws of the State from which the 
fuijiiive escaped. He would be discharged by the 
simple operation of the \a\v which there prevailed, 
making every man equal to every other man. If 
there were no positive law prohibiting slavery, the 
law of nature remaining unrepealed would fix the 
relations of every individual within the territory. 
The Constitution, then, for this single purpose of 
the recovery of the fugitive slave, overrides the 
local law of freedom, and, by giving extra territo- 
rial force to the laws of the State from which he 
fled, authorizes his recaption. It also assumes the 
duty of judicially surrendering him upon the claim 
of the party to whom his services are due, when 
established by proper evidence before its tribunals. 
It is a case, then, arising wholly under the Consti- 
tution of the United Stales, since, but for that 
clause in the Constitution, no such claim could be 
made or pursued in a free State. No State court 
could have entertained jurisdiction, as such, of an 
application to restore a fugitive slave. The courts 
of a fiee State could not apply the rule of comity 
to the laws of a foreign Slate contravening its own 
[lolicy; and, notwithstanding the clause in the Con- 
sititution, if a slav« be brought voluntarily into the 
jurisdiction of a free State, and there escape, no 
remedy whatever exists for his recovery. The 
claim of the party'^n a free State is strictissimi juris. 
The presumption, in the first instance, is always 
against its validity, and it must be clearly estab- 
lished in order to subject the individual seized to 
the di.sabilities under which he is placed by the 
Constitution. We hive then, sir, presented in a 
free State a controversy between parties who are, 
til the contrary is shown by evidence, presumed 
to be of equal rights; the object of the claim is, by 
the judgment of a judicial tribunal, upon evidence, 
to degrade one of tliem to the condition of a chattel, 
and cause him to be delivered up to the absolute 
power of the other. 

Let it be assumed, then, in accordance with 
what is really the presumption of law, or, in other 
words, what the law itself assumes, that the per- 
son claimed is a freeman — a citizen of a free State, 
and entitled to protectioii Jis such — v/hat tribunal 
is he entitled to demand ir enable him to maintain 
his rights? Does the Cnn-stitution of the United 
States authorize a postmaster appointed by the 
Postmaster General, a collector, a commissioner 
even, to settle this important question — a question 
of far greater magnitude than any that can be 
brought before our judicial tribunals, aftecting 
property merely ? Is it right or safe, that high ju- 
dicial duties of this sort should be imposed on the 
subordinate executive officers of tiie Government — 
offieers who are not selected with any view to their 
competency to perform them ? Or ia not every in- 
dividual thus seized entitled to have his case tried 
and heard before the ordinary judicial tribunals of 
the land — before independent judges, who are ap- 
pointed for the administration of justice in all con- 
troversies coming within the jurisdiction of the 
judicial power of this Governnient? If it be true, 
as the Supreme Court have declared it to be, that 
these controversies arising under the Constitution 
are within the express delegation of the judicial 
power, upon what ground is it claimed that any 
portion of this power can be vested in persons 
who are not appointed in the constitutional mode 



16 



for the exercise of judicial functioVA ? In the case 
of Martin & Hunter, decided as early as the first 
Wheaton'e Reports, the Supreme Court of the 
United States '* held that it was the duty of Con- 

• grf ss to vest the wliole judicial power of the Uni- 

• ted States, in courts ordained and established liy 

* itself." Therenuuk, it is true, was subtequeniiy 
qualified, and confined to that judicial power which 
is exclusively vested in the United States. It has 
been shown that the pow er now in question is ex- 
clusively vested in the United States, atid does not 
pertain to the State j^overnmenls or their tribunnl.s 
jn the free Slates. In the case of tiiuiston vs. 
Moore, in the 5ih of Wheaton's Reports, Judj2;e 
Washington, who gave the opinion of the court, 
disclaimed the idea that Congress could authorita- 
tively bestow judicial powers on State courts and 
magistrates; and ii was held to be perfectly clear 
that Congress cannot confer jurisdiction upon any 
courts but such as exist under the Constitution 
and laws of the United States, though the State 
courts may exercise jurisdiction in cases author- 
ized by the laws of the Slates, and not prohibi'ed 
by the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal courts. 
This decision of the Supreme Court was in con- 
formity with a decision which had been previous.ly 
n:adn by the high Court of Delegates in the Stute 
of Vifginia. How then, I ask again, consistently 
with tiiese <!ecision.-<, and with the express provix- 
ion of the Constitution " that the judicial power 
' of the United States shall be vested in one Su- 
' preme Court, and in such inferior courts as Con- 
' gress may from time to time establish, whose 
'judges shall hold their offices during j;ood belm- 
' vior, and shall receive a compensation that aiuili 

* not be diminished during their continuance in of- 
' fice" — how can it be claimed that the judicial 
power can be vested in any other officers than 
the courts or judges so ajipointed .•' 

On the other hand, if this be not a judicial power, 
it cannot be imposed by Congress on the court^' or 
judges of the United States. As early as 1791 
Chief Justice Jay and Judges Gushing and Duaiie, 
in considering an act of Congress imposing certain 
ministerial duties on the courts of tlie Unind 
States, unanimously declared liieir opinion "that 
neither the legislative nor the executive branches 
can constitutionally assign to the judicial any du- 
ties but such as are properly judicial, and to be 
performed in a judicial manner." In 1792 Judges 
Wilson, B'air and Peters addres.'ed a letter of 
similar import to President VVashiii^tnn. Judges 
Iredell and Sifgreaves also protested in an elalio- 
rate opinion against the attempt. The duty under 
this clause in the Constitution providing for ihe 
delivery of fugitives from service is of the same 
character, and is to be administeied in the .^sanie 
way as if it were stipulated in a treaty with a fiu- 
eign Power, it was under a clause in our treaty 
•with Spain stiiiulatins for the custody and sale 
delivery of merchandise coming into our por's 
under peculiar circumstances, to the Stiamsh 
owner, that the claim was made in our courts du- 
the surrender of the Amis'.ad negroes. P.y the 
treaty, if they were merchandise, as they were 
claimed to be l>y the Spaniards', who had put them 
on board of the Amistad in Cuba, and fidin wlmse 
posset^sion and c<uitrol they had escaped by a 
successful revolt, the Government of the Uniied 
States wa.i bound, through its judicial tribunals, 
to deliver them up to their claimants. But the 



Africans insisted that they were not merchandise — 
that tliey were freemen. Ttiey stood bif.ie our 
tribunals upon an equal fooling with th<r claim- 
ants. They had a right ti» insist tlial their 
claimant^, when they called on the courts of the 
United Slates to reduce to slavery men who were 
apparently free, must .•<h(v.v some lav, having 
force in the place where they were taken, which 
made them slaves; or th.-u the claimants were en- 
tiiled in our cuuris to have si>me foreig.i law, 
obligatory on the Africans as well as on ilu-. claim- 
ants, enforced in re.-jpect to them; and that by such 
foreign law they were siavf s. 

It ap[)eared most salisfictorily by the evidence, 
that liiey were kidnapped ACricans!, rerenily im- 
ported into ihe Island of Cuba, in violation, not 
only of their own rii;his, but of the laws of Spain 
abolishing the slave-trade. The Supreme Court 
held, that if tliey were at the time lawfully held as 
slaves inider the laws of y(>aiii, and r(C(>i;fiized by 
those laws as propt-riy capalile of lumg bought 
rind sold, they were, wnhin the initnt of the 
treaty, included under the ilenominaiion of mer- 
chandise, and aa such ought to be res!oi*( d to (lie 
claimants; for iqion that point, s;iy the i-ourt, (he 
laws of Sp.jiin would stem to furnish the proper 
rule of interfiietation. " But admii ing this," 
Judge Story (Toceeds, " it is char in our opinion 
that neiilier of the other essential fads mikI lequi- 
siits has bfen istablished by proof; aid the cnus 
pri'bantii of tioilr \\fp upon the claimants, lo g've 
rise to the casvs fadcris.^' •* it is a mo.'-t iin(i<ut- 
'ant consideration, that supposipj; ihc^^e African 
'negroes not to be slaves, but k dnapptd trte lie- 
'grots, the treaty with Spain CHiniot lie obligatory 
' on them, and the Uinted S'aies are IkuidU io le- 
' spect their rights as- mucli as those of S| ani.sh 
'subjects. The ••onf] ct of rights betwf-en the 
' parties, under such ciiTiiint^tai i es, bt (-(.rnt « posi- 
•tiveand inevitable, and must be decided upon the 
'eternal principhs of ju.stire ami interi ational 
'law. If the coniesi weie about any goods on 
' board of this ship, to which Ani(ii>an citizens 
'as:<eited a title, whii h was denitd by theSpani.sh 
' claimant.v, theie could be no doubt of the light of 
' .'^iich American ciiizMiS in litigate the clcini be- 
' fore any compeieni Anurfan tribiii al, notuiih- 
'Maiiding the irmly wnh Spain. Jl /.jrliaii ihe 
' doctrine must ap| ly v. hen human li>e at il human 
'liberty are in is.>-ue, and consiituie ilie vtrye«- 
' sence of the coniio\p|Ky." Such, with the xingle 
exceptifui o' Mr Jusiicf Baldwin, of Pennsylva- 
nirt, who disst nied, was the iiiianinious opinion of 
the Su|)ienie Court of the United Siaies. 

The inqiiiiy ihen was, !» fore the court, sitting 
as u Court of A(1mir»l!\ , in rei'Hrd to the truth 
and foundation of the chinns of iiuse S[>aniards, 
who insisted that the All ii'ais who had bet n in 
their custody as slaves, v.nf rrally .slaves dy (he 
law ill force in Cuba. 1 he Supieii;e Cmirt <Jc- 
cided, nr.d properly decided, that liert — theie 1 eing 
no treaiy of exuadiiimi I'y which iluycKuid !« 
demanded by ihe S()alli^ll Goveinmein as crimi- 
nals; liui only .'1 stipulation f.tf iheir di liiei y us 
merchfiiidise, if ihey vveie iciilly nhcIi — the fact 
must be (stablinhed beloie oui inhunals by saits- 
faciory evidence, mid that the duty was iieceffta- 
rily devolved upon the court to inquire int."; the 
exis'eiice and ot'h};aiory fope ii[>oii the paiiiea of 
the Spanish laws which they respectively asserted 
and denied. 



17 



But it is asked, "Why not send back these 
prrsons to the State from which they are alleged 
to have escaped, and let the inq[uiry be made 
lliere ? Tlave you no conllufiice. in the tribunals 
of those Slates under whose laws they are claimed 
to be held in servitude ?'' It is not a question, sir, 
whetlier tli<:re is confidence in those tribunals or 
not. The question is one affm.-ting the liberty of 
an individual who has a right to remain v/here he 
is, and to assert his freedom in the State where he 
happens to be, until his right is disproved by evi- 
dence. But he is not demanded for trial. He 
will have no trial if delivered to the claimant. If 
he is in truth a freeman, and known to be so by 
his pursuer, he surely will never be taken to any 
State where he can have the benefit or opportunity 
of another trial. He will be sold into some remote 
part of the country, where he will be surrounded 
by no friends who can aid him in establishiniv his 
claim to freedom, where no evidence will be at- 
tainable to sustain it, where every presumption 
would be that he is a slave, and where, in addition, 
the certificate of the post-master or collector ac- 
companying the .«ale would, in all probability, be 
deemed quite sufficient to doom him to hopeless 
bondage. It has been said by a humane judge 
that It is better that ninety-nine guilty persons 
should escape punishment for their transgressions i 
than that one innocent man should suffer unjustly. 
if that be so in regard to those who are charged 
with crime, with how much nioie propriety may 
it be said that it is better that ninety-nine bondmen 
held in involuntary servitude should escape than 
that one freeman should be made a slave, or one 
free woman be surrendered up to the uncontrolled 
will of a master. 

If, sir, it be so important in the free States to 
have an independent judicial tribunal to settle this 
question, why is it not equally so in other States, 
where every colored man is presumed to be a 
slave ? 

Suppose that a freeman from the State of Con- j 
necticut — and the case has actually occurred — 
pursuing his lawful business as a mariner, goes 
into one of the ports of South Carolina, and is 
there seized, not because he has committed or is 
suspected of any crime, but for the mere color of 
his skin, and inri>risonetl. The master of the vessel 
refuses to pay the jail fees that are endeavored 
to be extorted from him, and leaves the unfortun- 
ate freeman incarcerated in a jail, from which he 
has no hops of deliverance until he is sold as a 
slave, under the statute law of South Carolina, 
for the payment of his jail fees. Suppose this 
free citizen thus sold into elavery to have suc- 
ceeded in escaping, and to have found his way j 
into another State, and to be there pursued by the j 
person who bought him a-? a slave. Will not that j 
freeman be entitled to have the question of his 
freedom tried v.'here he is seized, before a tribunal 
competent to decide it? Must be submit to the 
decision of some inferior executive or ministerial 
ofScer, in a state where, perhaps, a similar law 
exists, and who would of course recognize the 
validity of the sale? No, sir, he has a right to 
demand of the Government of the United States, 
who have volunteered iu the performance of this 
duty, that they shall give him an opportunity of 
asserting his rights before a competent judicial 
tribunal, where he shall have the same measure of 
justice to which every fre-e citixen is entitled. Sir, 



this is no hypothetical case. Many years ago I 
received a letter from a gentleman, now a distin- 
guished oflncer in the service of the United States, 
then residing m Louisiana, enclosing a commis- 
sion to take testimony to prove the freedom of one 
of ray own townsmen, who, prosecuting a lawful 
voyage as a mariner, arrived in the port of Charles- 
, ton, and was there seized, imprisoned, and sold as 
i a slave, and had been taken by his purchaser to 
the slave market of New Orleans. He had named 
a person in Connecticut who could prove his free- 
dom. He was a native of the State of New York, 
but had sailed voyage after voyage from New 
Haven. The commission was sent to obtain the 
evidence necessary to establish his freedom. I 
believe he was ultimately liberated through the 
humane exertions of this gentleman, who interested 
himself in his behalf. 

But, sir, wh.at a feeble chance would a negro, 
unprotected, under these circumstances, have of 
escape, in a foreign jurisdiction, hundreds of miles 
distant from the place of his residence, surrounded 
by no friends, and knowing no individual who 
v/ould volunteer to aid him. Suppose, sir, that 
thi.^ same man, instead of being taken to New 
Orleans, had been retained by his purchaser in 
Charleston; and had escaped and found hia way 
on board of some vessel to Connecticut. Suppose 
he had been there pursued and claimed as one held 
to involuntary servitude under the laws of South 
Carolina; is he to be sent back to South Carolina 
for trial ? Would he be likely to get justice there ? 
to obtain deliverance from those who were ap- 
pointed to administer the very laws under which 
a free citizen had been sold into slavery— laws 
which were passed and have been continued in dis- 
regard of the constitutional obligations of the Sta.te 
toward the citizens of other States? No, sir, if 
that man had returned to Connecticut, and when 
there, in the bosom of his own family, had been 
pursued and seized, he Vi^ould have been entitled, 
before he could have been taken from that State, 
to a trial of his right before some judicial tribunal 
competent to administer justice, under all the 
forms and solemnities, and upon all the substantial 
requirements of evidence ever required in courts of 



justice. 

This lav/ of South Carolina was enacted long 
anterior to any of the imputed aggressions by the 
fixe States on the rights of the South. I find, sir, 
in Kiles's Register, under the date of September, 
1823, an opinion delivered by Judge Johnson, then 
a distinguished Judge of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, a native of South Carolina, in the 
case of a British colored seaman who had been 
seized and imprisoned under this law, iri which 
i he says, in regard to its " unconstitutionality, it is 
I ' not too much to say itwill not bear an argument; 
' and I fesl myself justified in using this strong lan- 
' guagefrom considering the course of reasoning by 
I ' which it has^Jeen defended." 
j Mr. Wirt, then Attorney .General of the United 
I Sla.t€s, whose opinion in rej:;:a-a to the constitu- 
I tionality of the South Carolina law us=! required 
by the President, in consequence of the remon- 
strance of the British Government, who complained 
of it as in violation of the treaty, declared it to be 
unconstitutional, in terms equally decisive. That 
law, sir, is in the«e words: 

''•And be it furlher enacted by the authoriiy aforesaid, That 
if liny vessel siiall come into aiiy port or harbor of Uiiu Stale, 



18 



from any other Slate or foreign jiou, V.'iviiig on board any 
FRBK negro«3 or pcrsone of color, as cook^■, stewarris, or 
mariners, or in any other employment on board of said ves- 
seJfl, ifucli FREE negroes or persons ofeolor siuill be liable to 
be tieiied and oontined in jail until said v.-sseis Kliall eliar 
out and depart fioni this State; and ihrt! when said %'essfl 
U rHady lo .sail, the captain of said vessel kliall be bound to 
carry away th'j said free negroes or persons of color, ami 
pay the expenses o( his detention; and in case of his ne- 
glect or refusal so to do, he shall be liable lo he. indieted, and, 
on convietinn thereof, :,hall he fined in a snni not i< ss than 
one thousand dollars, and imprisoned not !e.-s than two 
months; and Buch free negroes or persons of color -Jiall 

be SEEMBD ANU TAKEN as ABSOLUTE SLAVES and SOI.U ill 

conformity to the provisions of the act passel on the 2yth 
day of December, eighteen hundred and twenty, aforesaid." 

Yes, sir, such free negroes and persons of 
color " sliall be deemed and taken as absolute 
* 8LAVES, and eold in conformity to the provisions 
' of the act passed on the 20th day of December, 
^ 1820, aforesaid." This is the law of the State 
of South Carolina — a State which has so loudly 
complained of the northern States for the non-ful- 
fillment of the duties imposed upon them by the 
Constitution in regard to the surrender of f',^i- 
tives from slavery. But, sir, this is not all. The 
State of Massachusetts, a few years since — in the 
year 1844, if I recollect right — desirous of testing 
the validity of this law, so injurious and oppressive 
to her citizens engaged in commerce and navigation, 
sent one of her most respected and estimable citi- 
zens, a gentleman of high-bred courtesy and honor- 
able deportment, a lawyer of eminence at the Mas- 
sachusetts bar, who had been distinguished a^ a 
member of the Congress of the United States — to 
South Carolina, for the purpose of adopting the 
proper measures to enable her to vindicate before 
the Supreme Court of the United States, the claims 
of her free colored citizens to the protection guar- 
antied to them by the Constitution. On his arri- 
val at Charleston, he commutiicated in respectful 
terms to the Governor of that State the objeit of 
his mission; and within a day or two after, in 
pursuance of the spirit, if not in accordance with 
the direction, of some act or resolution passed by 
the General Assembly of the State, he was driven, 
under threats or intimations of violence if he re- 
mained — from her limits, accompanied by his ac- 
comp!i,'3hi:d daughter, a descendant of one of the 
fathers of this Republic, who signed the Declara- 
tion of Independence, and was an active member 
of the Convention that framed the Constitution. 

But, sir, this is not all. The legislation of that. 
State shows that they were unv/i!ling to trust not 
merely the Supreme Court of the United State.-^ to 
decide upon the constitutionality of this law, they 
dared not risk the question before the tribunals 
even of South Carolina herself. They actually 
passed a law, after the expulsion of Mr. Hoar, 
depriving the poor free colored men, imprisoned 
under this law, of the writ of habeas corpus! Heie 
it Ls: 

AN ACT of South Carolina, December 18, 1844. 
Be it enacted by the Senate an-t House oflrReprtsentritijes 
^'c, That no u<i;ro or free person of color, who shah enter 
this State on board any vessel as a cook, steward, or mari- 
ner, or in any other employment on board such vc.=<s.'l, and 
who shall be apprehended and confined by any slierifi", in 
pursuame of the provisions of said act, shall be entitled 
10 the wuiT OF IIABEA8 CORPUS, or any beneiit iiiidtr and 
by virtue of the statute made in the kingdom of England, 
in 31 chap. 2, entitled "An act for the belter securing tlie 
liberty of the tnhject and to prevent imprisonment beyond 
eeas," and made of force i:i this State: and the provisions 
of the said hchcas corpw act, andlhi; several acts of Assem- 
bly of this Slate, amendatory thereof, are hereby di^elared 
not to apply to any fre« ncgto or person of color enici ing 



into this State contrary io the provisions of tho afbresaid 
act of Assembly, passed December 19, 1835. 

In the same ppirit of ngs;res3ion upon northern 
rights and the rii;ht3 of northern freeiYien,and to 
prevent the possibility of their o!)(aining redress 
through the courts either of the Federal Govern- 
ment or of the Stale, another act w^ia passed on 
the s.ime day, which subjects to banishment, and 
such fine and imjiriaonmenl as may be deemed fit 
by the court which shall try ihe offender, any per- 
son v/ho, on his own behalf or under any com= 
mission or authority from another Slate, ahal? 
come within the limits of South Carolina for the 
purpose, or with intent to disturb, counteract, ot 
hinder the ops-ration of ihe laws or reg^uiation? 
passed, or which shall be passed, in relation tn 
slaves or free persons of color, &c. 

Thus, it will be seen, are these free colored citi- 
zens of the northern S'ates — unconstitutionally 
imprisoned in the jails of South Carolina — not 
only deprived of the right of resorting to the courts 
of the United States by the intervention of others 
in their behalf, but the writ oHiabeas corpus befor? 
the tribunals of the State is also denied them 
And, as if this were not enough, tiiese unhappy 
men, guiltless of crime save the color of their skiO: 
when thus deprived of all opportunity of deliver- 
ance by law, if thty are not taken away by others. 
ant! have not the means of paying the extortionate 
demand for their ov/n illegal cu.stody, are to " b<2 
deemed and t.qken to be .slaves and sold" to pay 
for the expenses thus incurred ! 

I will not trust myself, Mr. President, to char- 
acterize this law, and 3 deeply regret that such a 
one .should be found on the statute books of any 
of these States. Sir, whom does it affect? Citi- 
z^ms of the free States of this Union ; men as much 
entitled to the rights of citizens aa are men of any 
other color or complexion whatever. Sir, when 
the constitution of the Unitnd States was framed, 
colored men Yoted in a ntajority of these States 
Thev voted, sir, in the State of New York, in 
Pennsylvania, in Ma.ssachusetts, in Connecticut. 
Rhode Island, New Jer.sey, Delaware and North 
Carolina, and long after the adoption of the Fed- 
eral Constitution they continued lo vote in the good 
old State of North Carolina, and in Tennessee al-so 
But, sir, the right of voting i.s not essential tc 
citizenship. The free colored inhabitants of the 
United States are by the Con.stitinion as much the 
basis of representation as any other citizens. The 
Constitution of the United States makes no dis- 
crimination ofeolor. There is no woid '-white' 
to be found in thai, instrument. All free people 
then stood upon the same platform in regard tc 
their political rights, and were i:o recognized in 
most of the States of this Union. How, then, is 
it that one of ihfsc States vt>ntures to assail the 
rights of citizens of other States thus sacredly 
guarded by the Constitution ? 

Mr. BADGER. With the permission of thf 
Senator, 1 would ask whether free black persos)? 
are allowed to vote in Connecticut now? 

Mr. BALDWIN. Mr. President, they are not;, 
but they are none the less citizens th;tn if thej' 
ivere allowed to vote. They vote in all the New 
England StPtea except Connecticut, and, in my 
judgment, they ought to be allowed to vote there 
also; and when the propo.sition was made not Ions 
since for an amendment of the constitution of Con- 
necticut to enable them to vote, I deposited ray 



i9 



ballot in fa/or of the right. I should do so again 
f the opportunity occurred. I ho!d, sir, in regard 
to the political rights of freemen, whatever may be 

ZrZnl'''"'VV^''' '"''-'^ position. wYich 
«.ili regulate Kseif, there should be no dis inction 

cti'^'-nf n"^'r''^''i^''^^^^.^"'' ''^^y^'-*^ »«' only 

are m the State of Connecticut. 1 hold in -'V ^^^'^'^ 
the statute of the State of Virginia, p-^^ed Decem- 
ber 23, 1792, prescribing the^qu'-'''"'^^^ion of citi- 
zenship. It provides that: 

"All free persona born within the territory of this 
Dom»!)i!wealih, all p:?r3ons, not being natives, who have 
3l3tairi>-(l a righi to ciiizenship under former law.s, and also 
j!1 children, vvhi?resoever born, whose fathers or imthers 
are or were citizens at the tiiiio of thebiitli of such children, 
*sll bt: deemed citiz;Mis of ih.s Coinmonwealth until lliey 
■elinqniih tiiiit cliaructer in the manner hereinaftfcr men- 
tioned." 

It is a little curious to examine the history of 
;his law of the State of Virginia. It will be recol- 
ected by Senators that one of the articles of the 
)ld Confederation (article fourth) was in these 
ivords: 

" The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship 
md intercourse among the people of the (iitt'eront States ia 
his Uiiioii, the free inhabitants of e.icti of these State?, 
Miupers, vajiabond.-, and fujitives from justice excepted, 
h 2li be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free 
itizens in the several Staten ; and the p.iople of each 
Jtate shall have fr ■« injres^! and egress to and from any 
Khar State, and shall enjoy," &c. 

On the 35th of June, 1778, the delegation from 
South Carolina moved in Congress to amend that 
;lause in the articles of Confederation by inserting 
;he word " white" between the words " free" and 
•inhabitants." The question was taken, and 
ihere were found to be ayes two, noes eight. So 
;hat the article remained as it was originally 
idopted. In 1779, before the articles of Confedera- 
;ion had been ratified by a snilicient number of 
States to make ihcm binding, the State of Vir- 
ginia passed ati act prescribing the qualifications 
jf citizens, and inserted the word •' white." 

In 1783, after the adoption of the articles of 
Confederation, Vj^rginia repealed that act, and 
passed another, iir which she omitted the word 
' white," and left her law standing in that respect 
3ubstanti(tliy as it hris remained upon her statute 
jook from that day to this, showing that the State 
af Virginia, though concurring at that lime with 
South Carolina in the desire to insert the word 
" white," yet respected the decision of Congress, 
ind the States in the adoption of the articles of 
Confederation, and conforming her own law there- 
10, extended the privileges of citizenship alike to 
ill, without distinction of color. And to this day, 
in the State of Virginia, free colored persons, born 
in that Stale, are citizens. 

Why, sir, who ever doubted that colored inhab- 
itants were citizens of the United States within the 
provisions of the judiciary act authorizing citizens 
af one State to sue before the Federal courts in 
another State.' Who ever doubted that a free col- 
ored inventor was entitled to the benefit of the 
patent law, or a colored author of tlie privilege of 
copyright, as citizens of the United States ? Who 
sver doubted that colored citizens, owning and 
navigating vessels of the United States, were enti- 
tled to all the privileges conferred by law upon 
i^essels owned by citizens of the United States ? 
rhsy take the oath of citizenship under the act of 



Febntary, 1793, fr «">■""'"& and licensing Amer^ 
ican vessels. '''"" ^^^^ questioned their right.' 
Are not V'^''^'^ seamen entitled to protection un- 
der yo-' ^'^^^^' aii'horizing the granting of protec= 
ll^. (-0 citizens of the United States who are 
serving as mariners on board your vessels ? Why, 
sir, the form of the protection is in these word?: 

" That the said E. F. is a citizen of the United States of 
America." 

Are they not citizens within the meaning of the 
act of May, 1820, making it criminal for citizens 
of the United States to engage in the slave trade ? 
Are they not citizens within the act forbidding 
licenses to carry on trade with the Indians to any 
but citizens ? Are they not within the firotection 
of our treaties, as citizens of the United States, in 
regard to any property they may own .' And are 
they not under the obligations imposed by treaty 
on our citizens } Are they not within your bill of 
rights, in the Constitution which was adopted by 
their votes, securing the liberty of speech and the 
liberty of the press, and all the other personal 
rights, to the people of the United States.' It 
seems to have been supposed by some Senators, 
tnat, m wruci «, mnnc n man a tuizen, ne muBt 
have a right to voio m the State in vvrhich he claims 
to be a citizen. Why, sir, aio ,.«* fomalpa in all 
our States citizens of the United States ? They do 
not vote. There are States in which naturalized 
citizens of the United States are not entitled to 
vote until they have acquired property qualific^.- 
lions to a certain amount, even though native citi- 
zens are not required to possess those qualifications. 
Sucli is the provision in the constitution of Rhode 
Island; and a similar provision, I believe, is con- 
tained in some other State constitutions. 

Again, it seems to have been supposed by some 
Senators that the claim is, because a man is enti- 
tled as a citizen of one State to all the rights and 
privileges of a citizen of every other State, that if 
he is a voter in one State, he has therefore a right 
to exercise the privilege of voting when he removes 
to another State. That does not follow at all. 
When he removes to another State and changes 
his domicil, he loses all claim arising out of his 
citizenship in the Slate which he has left. He be- 
comes a citizen or inhabitant of the State to which 
he has removed, and subjects himself, of course^ 
to its local policy. As an inhabitant of the State 
to which he has removed, he is not in a condition 
to claim to exercise the federal rights v.'hich per- 
tained to him when a citizen of another State, 
These rights are to be enjoyed only by those who 
remain citizens of other States than those in which 
they may have occasion to exercise them. 

Mr. Hamilton, on the 1st of April, 1783, moved 
an amendment to the ariicles of Confederation, 
" that the Treasury should be supplied m propor= 
tion, &.C. to the whole number of white and other 
free citizens," which was adopted by all the States 
e-Kcept Rhode I^nd. 

The act of Congress of 28th February, 1803, 
prohibits the bringing of any negroes or other per- 
sons of color, not being a native, a citizen, or 
registered seamen of the United States, into any of 
the ports of the United States. I have mentioned 
that by the law of the Slate of Virginia, as it now 
exists, free colored pejsons are citizens. By the 
charter of the city of Alexandria, at the time of the 
cession of that county to the United States as a 
part of the District of Columbia, all male citizens 



20 



possessing certain qualificatio., j^j^j jjjg ri^ht to 
vote, and among others persons w^qJ^^ ° 

But 5 will spend no more time upo. ,j^Jq p^j.j ^f 
the arg!imr-J t. Eiinuijh surely has beei. ^^y j^ 
show thai the free colored citizens of the noL^j.^^ 
States are entitled by the Constitution to all priv 
ileges and immunities of citizens in the several 
States to which they may have occasion to go. 
The law of Virginia, 1 may remark, was in force 
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, 
and doubtless the discussions which led to the 
change of the Virginia law of 1779 were fresh in 
£he recolleciions of the actors in the political 
scenes of that day. I think then, Mr. President, 
it will hardly be expected that the decision of any 
inferior local tribunal, acting under the laws of 
those States which thus disregard the federal 
rights secured by the Constitution to all the free 
citizens of the other States, would be deemed satis- 
factory upon a question of human liberty, to which 
a colored citizen of a free State seized as a fugitive 
slave might be a party. I think, sir, thatthe safe- 
ty of this classofciiizensdemandsthatthe question 
should be heard and decided by the permanent iu- 
uiciai triDunais oi mis vjoveninieiR. n » am rigiii 
in the views I have taken on this suhj^ct, then the 
bill proposed by ti^o Committee on the Judiciary 
certainly ought not to be adopted by Congress, be- 
cause it attempts to impose judicial duties on those 
whose offices neither qualify nor authorize them 
to exercise funrtions of that sort, and who are not 
appointed in the mode prescribed by the Constitu- 
tion for those who are to exercise the judicial 
power. But if these are not judicial duties, if this 
IS not an excrcipe of judicial power, then, I ask 
again, by what authority is it attempted to be con- 
ferred on the judges or the courts of the United 
Stales } 

On the whole, Mr. President, it appears to me 
Shat all that is needed upon this subject of fugitive 
slaves, is to amrnd the existing act of Congress 
so as to confint the exercise of the powers confer- 
red to the judges or courts of the United States, 
and to secure lo those who allege themselves to be 
free the advantage of an impartial jury to aid the 
courts in the ascertainment of facts. 

With regard to other grievances which have 
been complained of, I do not propose at this lime 
to examine them at large. The burden of the 
complaint, however, seems to be that petitions 
have been sent hf-re from time to time by great 
numbers of individuals in the norlhein States who 
are desirouf; that Congress shall exercise all its 
constitutional powers in relation to the abolition 
of the slave-trade here, and of slavery wherever 
the jurisdiction of Congress may extend. Well, 
sir, what then ? Is this any interference with the 
rights of any Sintc ? Is it any grievance of which 
the people of any State can complain, if these pe- 
titioners confine their request to the action of 
Congress, where Congress has tlaiientire and ex- 
clusive power of legislation ? Senators may not 
be willing to grant these petitions; but have they 
any right to say that they or their constituents 
are aggrieved by their presentment ? Sir, I have 
long entertained the opinion that, if southern 
gentlemen had been united in the desire that 
all agitation on this subject should cease, they 
would have listened to the petitions of the people 
of this District, who have repeatedly asked for 
legislation in regard to the slave-trade and slavery 



here. As long ago as 1802, the traffic m slaves 
carried on in the city of Alexandrta was attended 
with so many attrocitics as to cause « P^^^^"^' 
ment of it by a grand jury as a f «^f f^^^^f^ 
in<- legislative redress. A judge of the circuit 
court in this city spoke of it in 1816, m a charge 
^,the grand jury, as shock.ng ^^ .'^^^'^yi-^^^J 
all '-mane persons. And a pet.tioH for the sup- 
pressioi. .,(• [\^q slave-trade, and for the adoption 
of measure^ r^^ jj^g gradual abolition of slavery, 
was presented i.v. Congress by more than a thou- 
sand of the inhabit£.,tg, comprising a majority of 
the property-holders in the District, in 1828. Had 
the prayer of these petitioners been listened to, 
not only would the sickening scenes, of which the 
petitioners complained as so painful to the feelings 
of the people of the District, have been Ions since 
at an end, but the plan they recommended for the 
gradual abolition of slavery in the District would 
by this time have brought the system very nearly 
to an end, in the very way that it has been accom- 
plished in nearly all the States which have hither- 
to abolished it. 

nnmn!^:"'- >•"•' ^"^^ "^"'^^ tliat people from 
other parts of the country have petitioned , as well 
as the people of the District, who alone, it is said, 
are concerned. Is it at all surprising thiit they 
have done so, when they have seen with what 
neglect" the petitions of the residents of the Dis- 
trict have been treated by Congress — when they 
witness the continuance, unchecked, of a system 
to which they are in principle opposed, and far 
which, in common with the rest of the people of 
the United States, they feel that they are in some 
measure responsible? 

I will not, Mr. President, occupy further the 
time of the Senate in this discussion. I will only 
say, in conclusion — and I say it v/ith great defer- 
ence to the opinions of others — that there is, in 
my opinion, but one course to be pursued to calm 
the agitations that now surround us, and prevent 
their recurrence. It is to place ourselves firmly 
on the platform of the Constitution, adhering faith- 
fully to its compromises, and administering, in the 
spirit which animated our fathers, and in the light 
of their admonitions and example, the powers con- 
fided to us by the people. No compromises of 
principle are required for our security. No sec- 
tional concessions should be asked, or expectations 
encouraged; but even-handed justice secured to 
all. Pur.ouing such a course, I fear no'dariger to 
the Union. Its foundations are too deeply laid in 
the interests and affections of the people, and in 
their cherished recollections of the past, to be easi- 
ly disturbed. It is emphatically their govern- 
ment; and its powers, though wisely and carefully 
limited, are amply sufficient, if beneficently di- 
rected, to lead us to a higher degree of national 
glory and happiness than has fallen to the lot of 
any other people. 

Let us, then, be just and faithful to the Consti- 
tution, and fear not; acting on every question, as 
it is presented, in a spirit of patriotism, justice, 
and firmness. And whatever may be the result of 
our deliberations, if there be any who for such a 
cause are ready to cry out disunion, and encourage 
the formation of sectional combinations to promote 
it, they have only to turn their eyes in any direc- 
tion to see the hand-writing on the wall, in char- 
acters which cannot be mistaken, to want them 
to beware. 






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